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CENTRE FOR MIDDLE EASTERN  
AND ISLAMIC STUDIES

JEWISH SETTLEMENT  
in the  
WEST BANK  
the role of  
Gush Emunim

by

David Newman

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The establishment of new settlements throughout the world has been examined largely on the basis of their socio-economic justifications. Settlement policies vary according to the nature of the specific problem they are designed to meet. These include the alleviation of rural poverty and overcrowding, the extraction and exploitation of valuable raw material resources in unsettled areas, the opening up of new land tracts in marginal areas, and the inhabiting of strategic areas based on political motivations. The degree to which any new settlement project is successful depends largely on the ability of the planner to plan in as comprehensive and rational a way as possible and on the degree of integration between any new structures and existing ones. It is also essential that there is a willingness on the part of the settlers to undertake such a project and to make it succeed. Furthermore, the ruling authority must deem the project sufficiently worthwhile to be prepared to inject large capital investment and subsidies into the costs of the early years.

The use of settlement as a means to secure and control areas of territory is not new. The Crusaders' use of settlers in fifteenth-century Spain, the Hapsburg policies against the Ottoman Empire, Chinese colonization in Manchuria, the British military cantonments in India and the developments in the border regions of many Latin American countries are evidence of this form of activity. There are also many cases of specific groups establishing networks of colonies in an attempt to preserve their cultures, often against the threat of persecution and/or assimilation. The Amish communities in Pennsylvania have survived as a distinct sect by means of forming compact settlements and by the development of a regionally integrated folk culture. Similarly, the Hutterian Brethren live mostly in colonies scattered over the prairie provinces of Canada. The Maronite communities in the interior highlands of Lebanon came about as a result of flight from persecution in the fifth and succeeding centuries. From the eleventh century on, Druze settlement also began to play a major part in this same region. Elsewhere in the Middle East, the Ikhwan tribe formed desert



townships in Saudi Arabia in the early twentieth century, amounting to colonies of proselytising warriors to whom politics and religion were indivisible.

The settlement activity to be examined in this study is unique in that it consists of the establishment of settlements in an area already heavily populated, with few natural economic resources, and whose strategic value in twentieth-century terms is doubtful. Furthermore, the society which sponsors these settlements is deeply divided as to their importance. Reasons other than socio-economic ones have to be sought in attempting to explain the motivating force leading to the establishment of these settlements.

#### Political and ideological background

The Arab-Israeli conflict, notwithstanding the Camp David Peace Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1979, continues to be one of the major causes of international instability. Central to this conflict is the issue of the West Bank and a Palestinian Homeland. The past decade has witnessed an increased polarization of stances relating to this controversial issue, apparently leading ever further away from compromise and ever closer to renewed conflict. One of the major issues is the establishment of new Jewish settlements in the West Bank territory, most notably by the Gush Emunim movement and under the right-wing Likud government.

A major role has always been accorded the 'strategic' factor in both pre-State and post-State settlement planning in Israel. Kimmerling notes that "'Zion' was only a vague, unspecified and flexible territorial concept" (1), leaving its interpreters with a great degree of freedom within wider theoretical boundaries. Control over territories occurred only where and when the possibilities (i.e. the political situation, social conditions and financial resources) permitted it. Whereas Arab settlement was established over a much longer period of time depending on climatic conditions, security, access and natural resources, the Jewish settlement had to be located where space permitted,



particularly in the period between the first colonizations in the 1880s and the third major wave of immigration, starting in 1919. Blake (2) notes that the scattered distribution of villages in 1919 reflected the availability of land for purchase, thus leading to the colonization of the coastal plain, much of which was dune and swamp and thus largely uninhabited. From 1920 until 1931, settlement became more continuous and larger areas were colonized. However, these continued to be located in the valleys and plains of Central and Northern Palestine.

The political and strategic role of settlement in key areas in order to establish a permanent Jewish presence was a second stage in the early settlement process. It led to colonisation over a wider area owing to the need physically to control areas of land. In the intensive period of settlement activity that took place between 1936-39, 55 new settlements were established, mostly in areas uninhabited by Jews. The Beit Shean Valley, the Hula Basin, Western Galilee and the Menashe Hills were all areas of concentrated settlement activity which, it was hoped, would create a Jewish presence, thus facilitating the inclusion of these areas in an eventual Jewish State. Following publication of the British White Paper of 1939 (3), which severely limited the area available for Jewish settlement to a small part of Western Palestine, land was sought everywhere - particularly in those parts closed to purchase. Areas of land under Jewish ownership but not yet settled (such as parts of the northern Negev) were now hurriedly colonized by means of 'tower and stockade' settlements established overnight. By the 1940s, networks of settlements were being established to ensure Jewish regional defence and co-operation.

The territory comprising the State of Israel since 1948 took in all but a handful of the existing Jewish rural settlements, while development in the early years of the State laid stress on the consolidation and strengthening of this settlement network along the northern borders and in the sparsely inhabited Negev of the south. Following the mass settlement activity of the early 1950s, few new settlements were established between 1956 and 1967. The area which became known as the West Bank was not



included in the State of Israel, since no Jewish colonisation had taken place in this region. Whereas, therefore, this region had been the centre of the ancient Jewish kingdoms, it was not deemed to be as important to the Zionist enterprise as were the coastal plains and valleys.

Nevertheless, Kimmerling (4) notes that the West Bank and Galilee highland regions maintained their historical significance and were regarded by some groups as constituting an integral part of Palestine long after the beginning of Jewish colonization. Furthermore, Houston (5) states that

The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the repossession of the temple site in Jerusalem in 1967 have reawakened acutely the intense symbolism of place and land in the Jewish consciousness.

Since the occupation of the West Bank in 1967, there has been intense settlement activity in this region by the Israeli authorities (Fig 1). From 1967 to 1977, the new settlements were established along the eastern borders of the West Bank and the Golan Heights as part of a strategy, commonly known as the Allon Plan, the emphasis of which was on securing the new borders by means of 'defensible' settlements. These border areas contained the least dense Arab population concentrations (Fig 2) throughout the territories in question, and thus avoided the settlement of the densely-populated highland areas of the West Bank. It must be pointed out here that a large number of people had left these areas following the 1967 War. According to Harris (1978), some 93 per cent of the population of the Golan Heights (approx 100,000 people), and some 87 per cent of the Jordan Valley population (approx 75,000 people), had been forced to leave in this way. Thus, these areas were now vacant of population.

The issue of settlement in the occupied territories constitutes one of the major ideological divides within Israeli society. Within the all-embracing framework of Zionism, there remain alternative interpretations of what constitutes real

FIGURE 1. ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES POST-1967





FIGURE 2. ARAB POPULATION OF THE WEST BANK



Key to Districts:

1. Nablus: 1,587 sq km, pop. density 96 per sq km; 2. Hebron: 1,056 sq km, 112 per sq km; 3. Ramallah: 770 sq km, 115 per sq km; 4. Jenin: 572 sq km, 137 per sq km; 5. Bethlehem: 565 sq km, 98 per sq km; 6. Jericho: 338 sq km, 27 per sq km; 7. Tulkharm: 332 sq km, 218 per sq km; 8. Jerusalem: 264 sq km, 207 per sq km


Zionism. The major components of the Zionist ideology are those of nationalism, socialism, and religion. Secular nationalism gave rise to the political Zionist movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This general framework was then interpreted in a variety of ways by groups of people with specific socialist and/or religious beliefs (Fig 3).

A central element in the Zionist ideology, and more specifically the religious Zionist ideology, has been the actual territory in question. Two major ideological groups can be distinguished within the Israeli populace in relation to settlement activity in the West Bank, namely the socialist, secular Mapai (Labour Party) governments, and the private enterprise, religious-historic Likud government and Gush Emunim movement. These two general groupings maintain different approaches to the issue of settlement in the West Bank. Gush Emunim hold an ideological stance on the question of territories and settlement location, based on a fundamentalist religious viewpoint, which is centred around the concept of 'Eretz Yisrael' (7). This is a more extreme viewpoint than that of the Likud coalition who view the issue from an historical, rather than a religious, stance. The implementation of settlement policies based on this line of thinking has been specifically associated with the right-wing Herut party of Menachem Begin, which has constituted the major coalition partner in the Israeli government since May 1977. Gush Emunim represent a radical extension of this viewpoint. The Mapai group hold a more pragmatic view concerning territories and settlement location based on the notion of 'defensible' boundaries. This argument was advanced most notably by Deputy Premier and sometime Foreign Minister, Yigal Allon (8).

#### The Study Area

The West Bank is a political, rather than a physical unit, brought about by the ceasefire lines following the 1948 War of Independence and the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan in 1949 (9). Excluding East Jerusalem, the area encompasses some 5,505 sq km. It contains three distinct north

FIGURE 3. POLITICS, IDEOLOGY AND SETTLEMENT IN ISRAEL



to south physical sub-regions, comprising the semi-arid Jordan Valley in the east; the eastern slopes, stretching from the valley to the mountain ridge to its west; and the mountain ridge itself (Fig 4). This mountain ridge is only part of the mountain belt which stretches from the River Litani in the Lebanon to the north, south to the Beer Sheba approaches. The mountains are bordered by the Coastal Plain to the west, the Negev Plain in the south and the Jordan Valley in the east.


The central uplands have an average altitude of 700-900 m, with the peak at 1,208 m in the Galilee. Such level land as is available is to be found in the upper parts of these highlands, above the steep slopes of the narrow valleys. Broad valley lands are rather restricted in Galilee and Samaria and completely absent in Judea. Water is scarce with no perennial rivers and little subsurface water at reasonable depths. By contrast, the coastal plain - which attracted the earliest Jewish settlement - has very favourable conditions for cultivation with plenty of level land, deep soil, and a reasonable supply of water.

Judea and Samaria (10) form part of Palestine's central massif, with Judea (the South West Bank) comprising the Hebron and Jerusalem mountains, and Samaria (the North West Bank) covering the area from Jerusalem north to Jenin. These two areas together cover some 3,700 sq km with a length of 130 km and an average width of 40 km. They are bounded on the south by the Beer Sheba and Arad basins and on the north by the Beit Shean and Jezreel Valleys. The Judean mountains extend some 70 km in length. Of this range, the Hebron mountains occupy half and form the highest continuous area of Palestine, never falling below 750 m and in places rising to 1,000 m. The southern part of the Hebron mountains is transitional and eventually merges into the desert.

Samaria is the smaller of the two regions, bordered on the south by the Ramallah foothills, on the north by Jenin and on the east by the Jordan Valley. Its western flank is the Tulkarn to Kalkiliya road. The region is some 60 km in length and some 40 km wide at its mid-point. Samaria lends itself much better to



FIGURE 4. THE WEST BANK: PHYSICAL REGIONS





farming than does Judea. Its annual rainfall of 700-800 mm is almost twice that of Judea and its soil cover is much more continuous. Its hills, generally 400-500 m above sea level, are considerably lower than those of Judea.

A major ideological factor motivating the Gush Emunim movement in their settlement philosophy has been the significance of Biblical and Jewish historical sites in Judea and Samaria. Many of the Gush Emunim settlements have been established by groups of activists whose objective was to settle sites on the strategic mountain ridge, the precise locations to be in the vicinity of important ancient Jewish sites. The area comprising the West Bank Highlands is known as Judea and Samaria to the Gush Emunim settlers, after the ancient Jewish kingdoms that existed in this region. Following the initial conquest of the land by Joshua in the twelfth century B.C.E., the Israelite kingdom was always centred on this region, with Jerusalem and Hebron becoming the major cities. Following the death of King Solomon in the tenth century B.C.E., the kingdom was divided into two. The southern kingdom became known as Judah with its capital Jerusalem, and represented the continuation of the royal line. The northern kingdom was initially known as Israel, but later adopted the name of Shomron (Samaria) following the establishment of a major city by that name. The significance of much of this region to the Gush Emunim settlers is seen in the names chosen for many of their settlements, which are often an exact duplication of the names of ancient Jewish sites in this region.

The whole of the West Bank came under Israeli military administration following the Six-Day War of June 1967. The region contained some eight administrative districts. The subsequent Israeli administration redrew these boundaries and reduced the number of districts to seven. The Arab population in 1967 totalled 598,637. In 1952, a Jordanian population census showed some 667,000 inhabitants. Allowing for natural increase, the reduction in population numbers from 1952-1967 was considerable, resulting from the exodus of Palestinian refugees in 1967 (some 250,000) and a sizeable outmigration of the male labour force. Decline continued until 1969, since when this

trend has been reversed. By 1980, the Arab population had risen to some 720,000 (835,000 including East Jerusalem). This population is distributed throughout a variety of towns and villages, mainly confined to the mountain ridge and the larger valleys. The major urban centres of Nablus, Ramallah, East Jerusalem, and Hebron are spread out along the north-south line of the mountain ridge. Smaller towns are Jenin, Tulkarm, Bethlehem, Kalkiliya and Jericho. The towns account for about 30 per cent of the Arab population. The rest are dispersed amongst some 380 villages, most of which rely on farming as their major economic source. Population density was 109 inhabitants per sq km in 1967, rising to 125 in 1977. Some 47.1 per cent of the population are in the 0-14 age group. This is due to both the high birth rate and the large male emigration in the 25-44 age group. It helps to explain why the labour force under Jordanian rule was small in relation to the total population (some 22 per cent). Employment has since increased, but this is due to the gradual economic integration of the West Bank as a source of cheap labour in Israel. By 1970, some 14,500 workers (128 per cent of the labour force) were employed in Israel, this figure rising to 37,000 (28.6 per cent) by 1976. In fact, the West Bank's marketing system has been largely reorientated to complement the Israeli economy as a result of Israeli policies since 1967.

The major source of income in the West Bank is derived from agriculture. Some 40 per cent of the land area is cultivated, although only about 2 per cent is irrigated. Cultivated acreage expands and contracts from year to year, depending on the variable rainfall. A census carried out by the Israeli authorities in 1967 revealed that 51,000 (42 per cent) of the West Bank households had farms. Most of the farmers lived in the villages rather than on the land itself, owing to the high degree of fragmentation of holdings with parcels distant from each other. The major problem for agriculture in this region is the lack of precipitation and the high rate of evaporation, particularly in the Jordan Valley. The northern part of the West Bank and the mountain ridge receive most rainfall and have always been the most productive regions. There are some high-value

crops, mostly fruit and vegetables, but the total crop acreage is dominated by large areas of cereals. Until 1967, subsistence farming was the rule with only part of the output reaching the market. Exports to the East Bank and neighbouring Arab states consisted of vegetables and fruits. Following the 1967 War, the 'open-bridges' policy of Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, enabled the import-export market of the West Bank with the rest of Jordan to continue. However, the long- and medium-range objectives were to integrate the West Bank agricultural production into the Israeli economy. In addition to maintaining its own local market and that of Jordan, West Bank produce is now also sold in Israel itself and exported to Europe through Agrexco, the Israeli agricultural exporting company. \*The introduction of crop specialization has led to the import of crops, once grown in the West Bank, from Israel. Furthermore, the increased use of capital-intensive methods has led to a decrease in the work-force engaged in agricultural production, resulting in larger daily labour movements to Israel. Finally, the drilling of some seventeen wells by Mekorot, the Israeli Water Company, and the confiscation of old wells to provide water for Israel, has resulted in a reduction in the amount of water available to the West Bank Arabs. Overall, West Bank agriculture is now faced with a decline in labour, land and water, despite the increased yields which have resulted from the introduction of new techniques and equipment.

The industrial sector of the West Bank has always been weak. It has suffered from its failure to attract capital investment, while its location, both physically and politically, has entailed high transport costs. This precludes expansion based on the import of raw materials or on markets abroad. Industrial development between 1948 and 1967 was based on private initiative. In 1967, the West Bank contained half the Jordanian population, but only 22 per cent of the industry and 16 per cent of the transport. Under Israeli control, there has been much subcontracting of work from Israeli firms, owing to the cheap labour market to be found in the West Bank. Although industry has grown slightly since 1967, it remains less than 10 per cent of the total domestic product of the West Bank, much of it being

highly dependent on the Israeli economy.

An analysis of the human and physical resources of the West Bank shows that there is little scope for new settlement structures, particularly if these structures are to exist in isolation from the predominant existing networks. Arguments that stress the strategic significance of Jewish settlement in this area do not mean that such settlements will be any less artificial in socio-economic terms. Nevertheless, the strategic argument has been used mainly with regard to the agriculture-based kibbutzim and moshavim in the Jordan Valley, where the resources for agricultural development do exist if harnessed properly. But even this does not apply in the West Bank highlands, where the indigenous Arab population is at its densest, where no large tracts of agricultural land are available, and whose strategic significance is relevant only in terms of how to defend these new settlements in a naturally hostile environment. This increases, rather than decreases, the minimum security requirements.

The importance attached to Jewish settlement as providing a permanent civilian foothold in a region and its associated defence-orientated thinking, recede in significance with the development of modern technological warfare. It will therefore become obvious that other reasons must be sought and understood to account for the settlement activities of Gush Emunim in what appears to be an unsuitable physical and human environment.

#### Notes to Chapter 1

1. Kimmerling, B., 1979, 25.
2. Blake, G.H. in Beaumont, Blake & Wagstaff, 1976.
3. Cmnd. Paper No. 6019, 1939, Palestine: Statement of Policy (The MacDonald White Paper). HMSO, London.
4. Kimmerling, B., 1979.

5. Houston, J.M., 1978, 232.
6. Harris, W.W., 1978.
7. The 'Land of Israel' or 'Eretz Yisrael' is the term used to denote the religious significance of the territory in question. It can refer to any of the territory within the biblically defined boundaries. The actual religious significance is derived from the Divine promises to be found in Genesis, 12 (18); 14 (8); 26 (3-4); 28 (15); 35 (12), while the extent of the 'promised' territory is mentioned in Genesis, 12 (18); Numbers, 34 (1-15); Joshua, 1 (1-6).
8. Yigal Allon was a leading member of successive Israeli Labour governments. It was his settlement plan that was unofficially adopted by the government for the West Bank, becoming known as the Allon Plan. As well as being Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, he headed the all-important Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee in the 1970's. He died in 1980.
9. For general literature on all aspects of West Bank history and geography, see bibliography.
10. The term 'Judea and Samaria' is used by many Israelis to denote the area of the West Bank, after its ancient names. It is particularly used by Gush Emunim and other settlement activists, who lay claim to the whole of the historic 'Land of Israel'. Following the election of the Likud government in 1977, the West Bank has been known only as 'Judea and Samaria' in government statements, reports, etc.



## 2. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

The Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 had an immense effect on Israeli political thinking and policies. The question of control over specific areas of territory was not confined to the realms of military thinking alone. Deep ideological beliefs and their relationship to the interpretation of modern Zionism and the permanent future borders of the State of Israel were brought to the fore. This led to much internal debate and conflict within Israeli society. Kimmerling asserts (1) that, after the Six-Day War,

pressures were felt within the collectivity  
to reintroduce this space into the cognitive  
map and relate toward it in expressive terms.

Similarly, according to Hirst, (2)

..... the modern Israelis rediscovered  
overnight something of the zeal and vision  
which had moved the early pioneers. It all  
gushed forth, this Zionist renewal, in a  
torrent of biblico-strategic, clerico-military  
antics and imagery.

Israelis were now being asked to make sacrifices for newly-acquired territory on the basis of 'historical right' as well as on security grounds. Nevertheless, the Israeli military administration in these areas confronted an indigenous population who disputed not only that claim but also the very basic foundations of the State of Israel. Israeli legitimacy needed reinforcement and since, in Judaism, historical rights are linked closely to religious associations, it was the religion that provided the necessary reinforcement. This can be said to hold for sectors of the population, most particularly those who later became the leaders of Gush Emunim, but certainly not for all groups. Waterman (3) sees the development of activity on the West Bank in a different light. He argues that, during the first twenty years of statehood, it was the Negev that acted as a peripheral pioneering area in the process of national growth and

development. In the post-1967 era, this was taken over by other regions such as the Golan Heights and the West Bank. These areas are less forbidding than the desert and offer greater emotional attraction and satisfaction.


From 1967 to 1980 there were three main phases of settlement activity in the West Bank, reflecting different government attitudes under changing circumstances. The first of these, 1967 to 1973 (the period between the 1967 and 1973 Wars), was one in which the traditionalist stance of the ruling Labour party was dominant. The second period, from 1973 to 1977, witnessed a continuation of this policy, but with increased pressure from the right-wing (particularly Gush Emunim) aimed at settling throughout the West Bank. The final period, from 1977-1981, has seen a switch in emphasis under the right-wing Likud government, to a policy of maximalist settlement throughout the territories.

#### The Allon Plan

The actual strategy adopted with regard to settlement in the territories was known as the Allon Plan (Fig 5) after its author, Yigal Allon. As the commander of the Palmach forces (4) in 1948, Allon had even then wanted to march into the West Bank. However, Ben Gurion had instead ordered him to advance into the Negev, since it offered wider expanses for potential national development. The situation in 1967 was one in which, if Israel were officially to annex the West Bank and the Gaza strip, it would add half a million Arabs to a population of less than three million Jews. Even allowing for Jewish immigration to make a net gain of 25,000 per annum (this figure would now be highly theoretical in light of the increased emigration rates in recent years) the Arab growth rate of 4 per cent per annum would mean that they would constitute 46 per cent of the population by 1993. From the demographic point of view, therefore, it would not be in Israel's interests to retain control over the whole of the West Bank. However, Allon argued that it was necessary to have a Jewish presence in what he defined as being the strategic defensive points in the West Bank. He therefore proposed a plan aimed at securing the border along the Jordan Valley by the



FIGURE 5 THE 'ALLON PLAN': 1967 AND 1980



establishment of settlements in the traditional Israeli manner. This would create a situation under which Israel would have 'defensible borders' and the area to be controlled would be the least populated part of the West Bank. The densely populated West Bank upland would be an autonomous region of its own with a corridor linking it from Ramallah through to Jordan. The Arab population would not have to become citizens of Israel and would not, therefore, threaten the Jewish majority (i.e., the *raison d'être*) of the State. Allon argued (5) that

A security border that is not a state border  
is not a security border - a state border  
that is not settled along its length by Jews  
is not a state border.

Israel argued that this policy would be in accordance with Article 49 of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. This prohibits the transfer of an occupier's population to occupied territories but it does permit the building of security outposts. Gerson (6) notes that, under international law, military necessity may justify seizure or destruction of enemy public real property. However, definition of 'military necessity' with any measure of precision has yet to be formulated and, were it to be so, then it would have to be judged by a neutral observer rather than by any active participant. Private property could undergo requisition only - never confiscation - even for reasons of military necessity.

The implementation of the Allon Plan started out as a security belt of Nahal settlements (7) along the Jordan Valley. By the end of 1970 there were six such sites. The Jordan Valley Settlement Plan (8), which covered an area stretching 60 km from Beit Shean in the north to Jericho in the south, and about 14 km westward to the border of the dense Arab concentrations, was based on the Allon Plan. The Allon road, marking a second north-south security belt, was built to link Mehole in the north (the first settlement to be established in the Jordan Valley) to Ma'aleh Adumim on the Jerusalem to Jericho road. Experience to date has shown that settlements on this inner road have faced the

most acute problems of development and growth. Whereas the Jordan Valley settlements have large tracts of agricultural land and the Gush Emunim settlements are sufficiently near to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to permit commuting, the settlements on Allon's inner road have neither advantage. They are relatively isolated and have found it hard to attract sufficient numbers of settlers.

Overall, it is the Government that determines the general areas to be given priority in settlement planning. Once this has been agreed, the specific site within these general areas is identified by a joint team of the Jewish Agency Rural Settlement Department and the Government. This latter decision is more concerned with technical and professional than with national political considerations and examines such factors as topography, soil and existing infrastructure. In those cases where the government approved the establishment of a settlement across the 'green line', the Minister of Industry, Bar Lev, proposed a loan amounting to 20 per cent of any investment in that project. This is equivalent to the amount given to projects in development areas inside Israel. The first investment under this plan was IL3 million (\$750,000) for the industrial zone in the urban development at Kiryat Arba, next to Hebron. Abbu Ayyash (9) states that in some cases this loan could be increased to as much as 50 per cent of the working capital in any industrial project in the territories. In 1970, the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee was established as the final decision-maker in matters pertaining to settlement location in priority areas. From its inception and until the election of the right-wing Likud government in 1977, this committee was chaired by Allon himself or by his closest political ally, Israel Galili. In this way, the Allon Plan became the foundation-stone of Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank.

#### The Land of Israel Movement

As part of the ideological debate concerning the future of these territories, pressure groups were established to reflect specific attitudes (10). Pressing for a complete retention of all the territories occupied in 1967 was the 'Land of Israel

Movement', established in August 1967. To this group, the issue was not simply one of control over a piece of land but was related to Jewish national destiny. The Movement became the first major group to break down the traditional Israeli political divisions to achieve a wide cross-section of public support for their maximalist doctrine. It drew together individuals from labour, religious and nationalist movements into a single framework, but one that remained initially a non-party framework. The LOIM was not prepared to compromise on any territory, not even Sinai, whereas the right-wing Herut party of Menachem Begin were prepared to do so under certain conditions. Isaac argues that the LOIM represented the revival of a traditional ideology (namely, Revisionist Zionism) which had never been renounced by some groups in Israel but had not had any practical relevance between 1948 and 1967. This position was one of 'normative Zionism', which

never denied the claim of the Jews to title over an undivided Land of Israel; it merely put the claim aside as of less importance under a particular set of historical circumstances than achievement of sovereignty over some of the Land in order to create a Jewish State under what were, in hard fact, conditions of severe external constraint (11).

The LOIM argued that an Israeli government had no right to surrender any land which 'belonged' to the Jewish people throughout history.

The short-term goals of the Movement were for extensive agricultural and urban settlement, economic integration of the territories, and the introduction of Israeli law within these areas. In the long term, they wanted full legal and formal incorporation of the territories in Israel. In 1969, LOIM members were elected for their respective parties and this gave them a limited power of internal government lobby by organizing themselves informally within the Knesset.

At the other end of the political spectrum, the Peace Movement was established. This group called for the return of all territories together with a full dialogue between Israel and all the neighbouring Arab States in exchange for peaceful relations. Thus, Abba Eban noted (12) that

Zionism, apart from its emphasis on territories and landscapes of the homeland, gives a central place in its consciousness to the aspiration for peace, and to repulsion from all superfluous domination of other people against their will.

Over time, the initial government consensus of 'territories for peace' began to crack, and members tended to adopt one of the two above-mentioned positions. Although both movements became increasingly marginal, especially when they attempted to become part of the political establishment rather than operating as extra-political pressure groups, they nevertheless continued to provide alternative sets of justifications and courses of action for the decision-makers. They emphasized the importance of ideology to a government which prided itself on its pragmatic approach to the problem. The LOIM argued, as did Gush Emunim later, that, unless the government presented policies based on ideology, there would be no principles on which to base any action - even the Allon Plan. The LOIM avoided any illegal actions (although they helped the Hebron settlers of 1968 who eventually established the urban quarter of Kiryat Arba). In 1973, they joined the right-wing Likud alignment and by 1977 had been totally absorbed into this political grouping.

#### Cracks in the Government Consensus

To understand the position of settlements with the approach of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and the subsequent emergence of the Gush Emunim Movement, it is important to describe the position taken by one of the country's leading political figures of the time, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan. He had been the key figure



in Israel's victories of 1967 and had become a national hero (a role he was to lose following the 1973 War). Although a member of the ruling Labour government, he argued for more extensive settlement in the West Bank and pressed for the adoption of a policy of total economic linkage between the West Bank and Israel. He proposed the establishment of four urban settlements adjoining the West Bank towns of Ramallah, Jenin, Nablus and Hebron. Dayan further argued (13) that it was intolerable that "the government of sovereign Israel should restrict Jewish land purchases in Judea and Samaria".

Although the Jewish National Fund and the Israel Lands Administration were delegated by the government to purchase land anywhere across the 'green line', the purchase of land by individuals or companies in the territories was prohibited by law. However, Gerson (14) points out that many unlawful sales were in fact carried out, especially around Jerusalem, in 1972/73. This was done by granting an irrevocable power of attorney and by postponing the registration of the transfer until such time as the government would permit private land transactions in the hope that they would then receive retrospective authorization. Dayan avoided the issue of the demographic problems that his policy would create for Israel by urging the adoption of a system of functional compromise. This meant that there would be a single economic entity, comprising both Israel and the West Bank, in which both Arab and Jew would work. However, each could belong to a different political entity, which would be decided on the basis of cultural and demographic identity rather than on geographical borders. Sovereignty over the West Bank would remain undetermined, but Israel would retain military control. The majority of the Mapai leaders at the time favoured Allon's more moderate plan to that of Dayan. His stance in 1973 over the purchase of land in the territories, together with the proposal to establish the town of Yamit in Northern Sinai, caused much internal conflict in the government ranks during the period leading up to the 1973 elections. At that time, Dayan was far too important a figure for the Labour party to lose just before the election campaign.

Thus, in the summer of 1973, a compromise agreement was worked out and presented in the Galili Document. This leaned towards Dayan with its emphasis on an increased rate of settlement activity and the extension of the settlement concept to include locations other than those necessary only for strategic and military purposes. The Galili document, therefore, moved towards a gradual implementation of the programs of the LOIM. Harris (15) argues that the chief significance of this compromise formula was, in fact, the written confirmation that it gave to six years of gradual 'minimalist retreat' within the Mapai ranks. Nevertheless, the mobilization of opposition from the Peace Movement and its supporters prevented the government from going even farther.

#### The 1973 War and Changing Attitudes

The Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 created a totally new situation, in which the decision makers in the Labour government substantially changed their outlooks and attitudes. Immediately following the War, there was a 'crisis of authority' (16), in which the political leadership was dealt a severe blow due to this unforeseen historical event. A great deal of prestige had been lost by the leaders and, to retain their support, they felt it necessary to institute a change in policy regarding the status of the territories. At the Labour Party Executive meeting in November 1973, the plans for long-term industrial development projects and increased Jewish settlement in the West Bank were not included as part of the new election platform. The accent changed from one of settlement to one of negotiated withdrawal. A major factor influencing this policy reversal was that, viewed in the pragmatic security terms of the Labour party, the settlements had not served their military function during the war. The army had had to spend valuable time evacuating the border settlements on the Golan Heights before it could turn its attention to the advancing Syrian Army. Gottman (17) notes that, in the modern era, several fundamental functions of territorial sovereignty are in question, not least that of protection. With modern weapons,



little remains of the sheltering role of territory controlled by national government within well-demarcated boundaries.

But the outcome of the War confirmed the views of hard-line elements, such as the Herut party and the Land of Israel Movement, as well. They were convinced that, had it not been for the buffer space provided by the territories, the enemy advance would have been even more rapid, resulting in catastrophic losses. They argued that the reason the settlements had been a hindrance during the War was because the development of the full regional settlement network had not been implemented by the government. There was thus a need for more rapid settlement development rather than a slowing down in establishing new villages.

#### Notes to Chapter 2

1. Kimmerling, B., 1979, 16.
2. Hirst, D., 1977.
3. Waterman, S., 1979, 171-181.
4. The Palmach were the striking force of the Jewish army (the Haganah) in 1948. It contained the crack units, many of them drawn from the kibbutz framework and thus highly ideologically motivated.
5. Cohen, Y., 1972.
6. Gerson, A., 1978, 163.
7. The Nahal are the military/agricultural unit of the army. They are used to maintain new settlements, often on the border, before civilians take over.
8. Jewish Agency Settlement Department, 1975.

9. Abbu-Ayyash, A., 1976.
10. The growth of ideological pressure groups concerning the occupied territories is comprehensively described in Isaac, R.J., 1976.
11. Isaac, R.J., 1976, 18.
12. Quoted in Isaac, R.J., 1976, 126.
13. Jerusalem Post, 30/3/73.  
See also: Ha'aretz, 27/6/69 and Yediot Achromot, 25/4/73.
14. Gerson, A., 1978, 142.
15. Harris, W.W., 1978.
16. This term is used by Sprinzak, E., 1977, 40.
17. Gottman, J., 1973, 127.

### 3. THE EMERGENCE OF GUSH EMUNIM

Following the post Yom Kippur War elections, held on 30th December 1973, the more nationalist 'young guard' of the National Religious Party became a pressure group within the party aimed at forcing the NRP only to join a new government which declared the right to annex all the territories. When the party leadership refused to accept this as policy, some of the 'young guard' decided to lend their support to the formation of an extra-party movement consisting of those people campaigning for the right to settle in any part of 'Eretz Israel'. The subsequent formal founding of Gush Emunim dates from 7th February 1974, when a group of several hundred activists attended a founding convention at Gush Etzion. Although the first settler nucleus for a site in the West Bank Highlands already existed, this convention represented the first official meeting of a national pressure group.

#### Ideology and Political Beliefs

According to O'Dea (1), Gush Emunim grew out of a situation of anomie which followed the 1973 War. A loss of morale had occurred within Israeli society and this prepared the way for the birth of a more radical movement. O'Dea argues that Gush Emunim were representative of a feeling of increased isolation which followed the Yom Kippur War and they therefore responded with a determination to go it alone and triumph over all opposition. They emerged in support of a hard-line government position on withdrawal and against the Kissinger initiative which resulted in a partial withdrawal from strategic points in Sinai.

The Gush Emunim ideology is based on a deep religious commitment to the concept of 'Eretz Yisrael' (lit: the Land of Israel). Immediately following 1967, the major policy decisions concerning the West Bank (with the exception of Jerusalem) had been security-orientated. The Allon Plan left the 'heart' of Judea and Samaria out of settlement activity. In Gush Emunim's view, such a policy put into doubt the claim to any part of Israel whatsoever. The Zionist claim was, according to their

traditional religious outlook, one of the Divine promise of, and the historical connection with, the Land itself. In Jewish history, no part of the ancient Jewish kingdoms had been as important as Judea and Samaria. This area had contained all the holy Jewish sites such as Jerusalem, Hebron, Shechem, Beit-El and Shilo. It was this area that now contained the dense Arab population concentrations and in which Gush Emunim held it imperative to establish a Jewish presence. The Gush Emunim manifesto stated that the government's failure to annex all the territories was a negation of "the obligation of the Jewish nation to establish full sovereignty in the land" (2). Although the Gush do emphasize the security aspect as well, it is only supplementary to the religio-historic argument. The underlying basis for their ideology is the principle that both the Jewish nation and the Jewish land are holy, since they were both chosen by God. The Land of Israel is the promised land and has its own sacred history and sanctity. The Gush see themselves as a spiritual elite forced into politics by the urgency of the hour in which the Israeli government strayed from Zionism. The government have to be stopped in their 'folly' by those who are rooted in Jewish traditional values. They view their settlement activities as a renewal of the pioneering trends of the early kibbutzim. This is important, since they feel that the ideological values which brought the State of Israel into existence are being forgotten and pushed aside. This concurs with Etzioni-Halevy (3), who argues that, compared to the pre-State period, there has been a dilution of the collective commitment and this has been emphasized by the slackening of pioneering fervour and the inability of the collective settlements to grow in proportion to the country's population. Gush Emunim set out not only to fulfil their religious obligations concerning settling the land as they saw them, but to carry them out in a way which they believed would reinsert the pioneering ideological values into society.

The method they adopted to carry out their policy of settlement throughout Judea and Samaria was known as 'hitnachalut'. The literal meaning for this term is 'colonisation'. However, the meaning as adopted by Gush Emunim

has come to signify something more than an ordered process of colonisation. To the Gush, hitnachalut represents the practical way in which their settlement philosophy can be implemented. It involves physically establishing a presence in the necessary area by squatting, even if it is against government regulations. If they are forced to leave, peacefully or otherwise, they must then return until they are allowed to remain as permanent settlers. This requires leaving their city apartments (although they rarely sell them at first) and initially settling in tents and huts. The idea of squatting was initially used in the case of Keshet in the Golan Heights, in May 1974, by a group of like-minded people trying to prevent the return of Kuneitra to Syria. Their belief was that once a settlement had been established it would never be surrendered. This basic belief was based on Israeli government policies concerning existing settlements and stems from the establishment of Jewish outposts and villages in the pre-State British Mandate period. Just as settlements had had spatial significance in the fixing of boundaries in the past, so too would the hitnachalut type settlements of the Gush have significance in the future. However, opponents of the Gush argue that there can be no comparison between their policies of 'hitnachalut' and the traditional policies of 'hityashvut' (lit: settlement) since the latter also represented the social and co-operative aims of building the Jewish society and not only the security aspect. To the Gush, the social form of the settlement is only a secondary factor.

There had been illegal settlement attempts before the emergence of Gush Emunim but these had been more of a demonstration against government policy than a serious attempt to establish permanent settlements. A group of Israelis had attempted to settle on Mount Gerizim near Nablus in June 1969 but had been forcibly removed by the military government. The first attempt by Gush Emunim to settle was in Horon, near Nablus, in June 1974. They were forcibly evicted. In the following month, a group of settlers squatted in the old Sebastia railway station in Samaria and were permitted to remain there for the night. The settlers turned down a government suggestion of an alternative location on the eastern border of Samaria overlooking the Jordan



Valley. This location was in the inner security road of the Allon Plan. They insisted on being allowed to settle permanently at a location on the mountain ridge itself. The government were unwilling to use force again, and after four days the settlers left of their own accord. Sebastia, nevertheless, became the scene of repeated settlement attempts and the rallying point for Gush Emunim. Other groups were organized for the Shilo, Ma'aleh Adumim and Jericho areas. In October 1974, a mass attempt at a number of sites throughout the West Bank marked the biggest challenge to government authority to date. As the Gush Emunim movement grew in size and organization, it made repeated settlement attempts at all of the four above mentioned sites (Fig 6).

The first change to take place in this continual pattern of squatting and being forced to leave took place in December 1976. A settlement attempt in the Sebastia region was this time allowed to remain temporarily in a nearby army camp by Defence Minister Shimon Peres. The settlers would remain there until the government had decided on a suitable alternative location. To the Gush, this was their first foothold in the West Bank. In the absence of alternatives acceptable to the Gush, the settlers gradually began to develop their existing 'temporary' home. At the same time, a group of settlers moved into Ma'aleh Adumim on the Jerusalem-Jericho road and a third group remained at Ophrah, north of Ramallah, having originally received permission to go there as a temporary 'work camp'.

#### Settlement Plans

From their inception in 1974 until 1980, Gush Emunim produced three settlement plans. The first and third relate to their overall objectives of widespread settlement throughout the West Bank, while the second was a plan related specifically to the period immediately following the election of the right-wing government in 1977.

On 11th February 1976, Gush Emunim produced a settlement plan (4) (Fig 7) calling for the settlement of one million Jews

FIGURE 6. GUSH EMUNIM SQUATTING ATTEMPTS IN THE WEST BANK, 1974-80.







FIGURE 7 GUSH EMUNIM 'YESH' SETTLEMENT PLAN, SPRING 1976



at 100 sites throughout the West Bank over a period of ten years. They described their plan as a blueprint for Israel's fourth decade. Whereas the first three decades had been periods respectively of immigration and settlement, agricultural consolidation, and industrial development, the fourth decade would witness a settling of the mountains. The introduction to the plan (5) stated that

It is the right and obligation of the Jewish people to settle throughout the width of the land and therefore it is forbidden that there should be any political obstruction in the fixing of settlements in Judea and Samaria.

The proposed locations were based on (i) the need for strategic control; (ii) the settlement of Jewish and State land so as to avoid the expropriation of Arab land; (iii) an attempt to fit, as far as possible, into the existing infrastructural network; and (iv) proximity to places of Jewish historical significance. An analysis of the proposed sites (listed in the appendix to the plan) shows that the strategic, political and historical considerations were dominant while the economic considerations were only secondary. Whereas only a brief note is appended regarding the suitability of each location for agriculture and/or industry in general, greater importance is accorded to the significance of the location in terms of domination over communication networks and the relationship to borders. The proposed locations are spread out along the main north-south route from Nablus via Jerusalem to Hebron, and along the east-west routes connecting this north-south line with the coastal plain to the west and the Jordan Valley to the east. The types of settlement to be established would comprise a three-tier hierarchy. There would be the small, closed settlement type of the kibbutz, moshav and industrial village, a larger rural type settlement for a few thousand people, and cities for tens of thousands of settlers. The framework would be a hierarchical one in which the proposed cities would be surrounded by the smaller settlements. The plan called for implementation to take place by means of redirecting government resources from the coast to Judea

and Samaria; the establishment of a company to invest in the development of Judea and Samaria; the extension of government ownership to all land over which ownership is doubtful; the establishment of the settlements in the traditional pioneering fashion; and the rapid development of the economic branches of all the settlements. The plan did not cover any specific point in professional detail. In fact, it is only eleven pages long, and half of it is the appendix listing the actual sites. It received scant attention from the government, particularly as Gush Emunim were not a recognised settlement movement. However, it served to show the total settlement concept that the Gush were espousing.


In the period between the publication of this plan and the right-wing Likud election victory in May 1977, the situation between the Gush and the government remained the same. The three unrecognised and 'temporary' settlements of Kaddum (now Kedumim), Ophrah and Ma'aleh Adumim underwent gradual, but unofficial, development. In January 1977, the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee added Mes'ha to a list of settlements that they recommended be established over the next few years. This location was only a few kilometres over the 1967 border and there existed a group of 300 families who were prepared to settle there. One week before the 1977 elections, the Labour government authorised Gush Emunim to move the first fifteen families into this settlement. This, therefore, became the first 'official' settlement in Samaria.

The election of the right-wing government of Menachem Begin signified a major change in the settlement priorities in favour of Gush Emunim. The basic policy guidelines of the Likud election manifesto of 1977 (6) stated that "the government, will plan, establish and encourage urban and rural settlement on the soil of the homeland". Gush Emunim viewed the Likud victory as a vindication of their squatting policies and believed that the new administration would legalize their activities. The new head of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee, Ariel Sharon, known for his hard-line policies, declared that the government's policy was to bring about widespread settlement in Judea and Samaria.

The immediate response by Gush Emunim was to present the government with an 'Emergency Plan' for settlement (7) (Fig 8). This proposed the immediate establishment of twelve new settlements along the mountain ridge of Judea and Samaria and the legalization of the existing 'temporary' unofficial settlements of Camp Kaddum, Ophrah and Ma'aleh Adumim. The Gush ultimately wanted the government to adopt new legislation concerning the status and the ownership of land in the West Bank. Since this would take time to implement, they proposed that the new settlements be established, whenever possible, in existing army camps. These would later be transferred to civilian control or the civilian population would be able to develop beyond the army camp limits into their own settlement. Alternatively, 'state lands' would have to be found and used. The twelve locations are all mentioned in the previous Gush Plan of 1976 and were seen as constituting locations of utmost priority. These twelve settlements would serve as a basis through which their more extensive, long-term plans for widespread urban and rural settlement could take place. Groups of prospective settlers were ready to move into each of these twelve locations and the Gush argued that it was necessary for the authorities to relate to these groups as they did to settlement nuclei in other parts of Israel. Additional nuclei would be created in order to make possible the establishment of further settlements in the long term.

The new government responded by legally recognising the three existing, as yet unofficial, settlements of Camp Kaddum, Ophrah and Ma'aleh Adumim on 27th July 1977. These newly recognised settlements were now entitled to the same aid from public funds as were settlements throughout Israel. Assistance included help in building semi-permanent homes, government grants and low-interest loans, and development aid in the field of educational, medical and cultural services. However, the government did not decide on any formal adoption of a timetable to meet the Gush demands. By September, the government had still not commented on the Gush plan and the Gush therefore decided to revert to their tactics of hitnachalut. They announced that they intended to settle in these twelve sites with or without

FIGURE 8. GUSH EMUNIM 'EMERGENCY' PLAN, SPRING 1977






government permission, and accused the new government of having failed to live up to its promises. They claimed to have 2,500 people waiting to settle at these sites. A compromise was reached between the government and the Gush by which the Gush settlers were allowed to move immediately into six military sites. The settlers would be employed at these army camps initially as civilian employees of the Defence Ministry with the possibility that eventually the army would withdraw altogether, thus leaving the camps as fully-fledged civilian settlements. The six sites, all located along the mountain ridge, were occupied by the end of 1977. This activity represented the first practical government departure from the Allon doctrine of only settling the sparsely populated border regions.

In July 1978, Gush Emunim produced their most far-reaching and extensive plan for settlement, the 'Master Plan for Settlement in Judea and Samaria' (8), which called for the long-term settlement of 750,000 Jews in the West Bank by the end of the century (Fig 9). In the short term it proposed increasing the number of Jewish settlers to 100,000 by 1981. The Gush plan was based on a number of influences. Firstly, they had their own previous two plans as a foundation from which to develop their ideas. However, they were now far more aware of the need to plan for practical settlement types and to define, in professional terms, the suitability or otherwise of specific locations for the establishment of settlements. In other words, having attained their political objectives, they now had to plan the means by which those objectives could be put into permanent effect. It is apparent from their 'Master Plan' that more research went into these problems than into their previous plans, which were more of a political statement than a realistic plan of action for settlement. Nevertheless, it remained a highly fictional plan with respect to its proposed population intake. Given that the total Jewish population of Israel is only just 3.5 million, and that emigration equals if not exceeds immigration, the expected hundreds of thousands of settlers do not exist. Similarly, the plan makes no mention of the necessary investment or where such money will come from.



FIGURE 9. GUSH EMUNIM "MASTER" PLAN. OCTOBER 1978



However, the Gush now had its own Settlement Division, known as Amanah, which consisted of people concerned solely with the settlement frameworks. Furthermore, they now had experience from the settlements which had been in existence for a few years. The Gush plan was related to the needs of both the 'rural' and 'urban' sectors as defined in the Israeli context. Finally, the plan was drawn up as part of a more comprehensive framework concerning settlement throughout Israel and not solely in the West Bank, although it argued that the latter area was in the most dire need of immediate action and that it should receive top priority in the allocation of government resources and investment. The overall plan proposed the establishment of two cities of 60,000 people each at Kiryat Arba and in the Haris/Tapuah area in central Samaria; four smaller towns of 20,000 inhabitants each at Dotan, Shomron, Shilo and Dahahiriya; twenty suburban quarters of 10,000 inhabitants each and 25 'clusters' of Yishuv Kehillati settlements, each with 250-500 families.

The plan included two appendices. The first of these discussed ways in which the necessary land for the implementation of their strategy could be acquired. With the development of settlements in the post-1977 period, the availability of land on which to establish new settlements and to expand existing ones became a major problem. The government finally passed a law allowing private purchase of land in the West Bank in November 1979. However, despite its hard-line policies, the government was not eager openly to confiscate large areas of private Arab land for settlement. Nevertheless, much of the land which was used was of dubious ownership. The government claimed that it was entitled to all land designated as 'State land' under Ottoman law, this constituting large amounts. In some cases, Arab landowners challenged the government's right to confiscate specific areas of land, mostly without success.

The second appendix describes the Yishuv Kehillati (Community Village) as being the most appropriate form of settlement for the overall regional strategy. This settlement type represented a totally new form of rural village, based upon

private enterprise and individual family units. There is little of the collective responsibilities incumbent upon members of the kibbutz and the moshav, nor are the settlers obligated to work in the settlement itself. Indeed, many of them commute to the major cities of the coastal plain. The overall diversity of settlement types would offer attractions to all sectors of society and would, therefore, make possible the transfer of people from the urban centres in the coastal strip to the West Bank.

The various Gush Emunim proposals were backed up by the two most influential decision-makers in the field of settlement in the post-1977 era. The Agriculture Minister and Chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee, Ariel Sharon, proposed a settlement plan in the autumn of 1977 calling for widespread settlement throughout the West Bank (9). In the following year, the new joint Chairman of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, Matityahu Drobless, presented a similar proposal (10).

#### Attempts to settle

The keynote of the Gush Emunim philosophy was the attempt to settle in the West Bank regardless of any other viewpoint. It was this that had caused them to adopt the policy of 'hitnachalut' and they pursued this policy at all times. Nevertheless, because of the differences of opinion regarding the strategic significance of different areas in the West Bank, the intensity of the struggle varied with the specific location. This can best be shown by an examination of the attempts to settle in two locations, namely those of Kedumim in the north of the highland area, and that of Kefar Adumim on the Jerusalem-Jericho highway.

##### 1. Kedumim

The settlement of Kedumim was established as a result of numerous squatting attempts carried out by the Eilon Moreh group of Gush Emunim at sites in the vicinity of Sebastia and Nablus in Northern Samaria, between July 1974 and December 1975. The establishment of the Eilon Moreh group took place in Kiryat Arba

in February 1973 (prior to the establishment of Gush Emunim, which took place in 1974) with the objective of settling in the vicinity of Nablus. Following the 1973 War, the objectives of the group were highlighted by their decision to help the settlers at the illegal settlement of Keshet on the Golan Heights (11). Following the Government refusal, in March 1974, to allow them to settle in Samaria, the group decided to emulate the Keshet example and take the initiative themselves.

Between July 1974 and December 1975, the group attempted to squat eight times in this region. The first attempt took place at Camp Choron to the south of Nablus. After remaining at the site for a day, the settlers were forcibly removed by the army and this resulted in widespread coverage throughout Israel. Two months later, a second attempt was made at the old Turkish railway station of Sebastia, 15 km to the north-west of Nablus. Apart from the members of the group itself, hundreds of sympathizers came to offer support and this was instrumental in bringing the whole issue of settlement in the West Bank Highlands to the fore of national public debate. The government allowed the squatters to remain for a few days while the issue was discussed in the Knesset, but eventually the settlers were ordered to leave. They complied with this request after the army was again sent in, although no force was used. The third attempt took place at the old police fort of Nebi Tsalah, 20 km north-west of Ramallah. This was part of a mass demonstration organised by Gush Emunim and its settlement groups on the night of 8th October 1974. In the following year, the group made two more attempts in the spring, both at the old railway station of Sebastia. Each time, the settlers were forcibly ejected. In July of that year, eight members of the Eilon Moreh group received permission to become employed as civilian workers for the military government of the West Bank and were allowed to sleep in the old railway station during the period of their work. This only continued for two weeks, after which the government ordered them to leave. Finally, in December 1975, a mass group of over 2,000 supporters went to the old railway station and remained there for eight days without hindrance. Prefabricated buildings were erected and the settler group established a school

and a nursery. This attempt took place to coincide with a Worldwide Jewish Solidarity Conference being held in Jerusalem, resulting from the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism. The conference affirmed "the historical right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel" and a group of delegates at the conference visited the Eilon Moreh squatters. The government were unable to order the removal of the settlers with this atmosphere pervading. Subsequently, the Defence Minister, Shimon Peres (head of the Labour Party since 1977), announced that the Eilon Moreh group would be allowed to remain in the 'heart of Samaria' as an independent unit, but they would have to move into one of the army camps. The Defence Ministry would allocate temporary accommodation for the 30 families of the group and the government would agree to hold a full debate on the issue of settlement in this region within the next two to three months. They would then be offered a more permanent location. Faced with the choice of moving into Camp Choron or Camp Kaddum, the settlers chose the latter, this resulting in the present name of Kedumim.

Eventually, the government offered the settlers a choice of three alternative locations where they would be permitted to establish a permanent settlement. These were Cochav Hashachar, Tekoah and Mes'ha (12), but they were unacceptable to the Gush at the time because, although located in the West Bank, they were not in the central highland area. These three locations all occupy sites within the framework of the Allon Plan, the first two being located along his inner line of 'defensible' settlements, while the latter was just over the 'green line' border in Western Samaria.

Initially, 15 families moved into the army camp, and a hillside just outside the camp was immediately prepared for their living quarters. The settlers themselves added extra tents and huts to the prefabricated structures allocated by the Defence Ministry. By June 1976, the group had expanded to thirty families (including 53 children) plus fifteen single adults. Within a year, they had built a communal dining hall, a synagogue and schoolrooms, and had extended the sewage system to their area



as well as having an independent electricity system. Two buses came each day to the settlement from Tel Aviv. A group of the settlers travelled daily to their jobs in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, while others were employed by the Defence Ministry (from March 1976) in the installation of the electric and sewage infrastructure. The Defence Minister also authorised the construction of a separate road to the living quarters, thus bypassing the army camp centre altogether. Nevertheless, the Labour government did not officially recognize the settlement as being legally constituted, meaning that all the development work came either by means of under-the-table handouts by Defence Minister Peres, or from the private resources of the settlers and the Gush Emunim supporters.

## *2. Kefar Adumim*

The settlement of Kefar Adumim is the outcome of the struggle to establish a civilian presence at the site of Ma'aleh Adumim. Together with the settlements of Kedumim and Ophrah, Ma'aleh Adumim became the third of the three pre-1977 settlements. However, it was established by manipulation of an existing government framework, rather than in opposition to government settlement policy. The location of Kefar Adumim is at the southern end of the Allon road, where it joins the main Jerusalem to Jericho highway. There had always been Labour government approval to establish some sort of Jewish presence in this area. In fact, the various proposals for settlement of the 'Wider Jerusalem' area all show this point to be the key location for an industrial area to serve Jerusalem. A major difference between the case of Kefar Adumim and that of Kedumim is that the present-day settlement of Kefar Adumim is an outgrowth of the settler nucleus from the temporary settlement of Ma'aleh Adumim B but on a new site, whereas, in the case of Kedumim, the present permanent location developed as a physical extension of the original temporary site. Ma'aleh Adumim B had been the location of the settlement since the original squatting in 1975, and consisted of two groups. The first of these was a Gush Emunim-orientated group who are now the settlers at Kefar Adumim. The second group were those interested in becoming the first settlers



at the Ma'aleh Adumim urban quarter, which constitutes part of the encirclement of Jerusalem with Jewish urban quarters.

Defence Minister Moshe Dayan had originally proposed the establishment of a town at this location within the Allon Plan framework. In October 1974, the Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek, announced the establishment of an industrial area at Ma'aleh Adumim for the location of heavy industry for the city. In the following month, the Israeli cabinet approved a three-tier industrial plan for Jerusalem, which included the establishment of an industrial estate at Ma'aleh Adumim on an area of 5-6,000 dunams. However, the only reference to any residential development concerned the construction of an estate to house the workers at the industrial area. This was because the Cabinet of Prime Minister Rabin was initially divided as to the wisdom of establishing a civilian settlement on the main road from Jerusalem to Jordan. Despite opposition from some ministers, the Cabinet nevertheless decided to allocate IL10 million (\$1.4 million) towards the development of the project, to cover the basic infrastructural work of building access roads and laying drainage, water and electricity systems. This was coupled with the levelling of a 700 dunam area for the development of the industrial zone and the construction of the necessary infrastructure, including roads and utility lines. The Jerusalem Economic Corporation, a government municipality corporation, carried out the work on behalf of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Gush Emunim were not satisfied with this action. They considered the site to be a key strategic location. The fact that the residential estate was to be only for single workers, signified to them that the government did not wish to create a permanent political fact that might be hard to remove should any agreement with the Arab world render it necessary. Furthermore, the Minister for Commerce and Industry stipulated that all industries must be large enough to offer employment to at least fifty persons each and that this must be Jewish labour. This was seen as a measure aimed at inhibiting short-term development at this site. Thus, a settler group with the objective of settling

at Ma'aleh Adumim undertook a squatting attempt on 2nd March 1975. This group was not officially affiliated to Gush Emunim, but many of its members were associated in a private capacity. The Cabinet acquiesced and subsequently decided that families, as well as single workers, could apply for housing here, but only if their livelihood was to be derived from the industrial area. Immediate temporary accommodation would be established on a nearby hill, 800 m from the edge of the industrial zone. Thus, in reality, there was little effective opposition to the squatting at this location.

In December 1975, the first settlers moved in, and this was followed by two further groups in the following eighteen months, including a group associated to the Histadrut (Israel Trades Union) and interested in eventually settling in the proposed urban quarter. Fourteen enterprises were approved in the first instance, one of them being a military-based industry aimed at employing 200 people in its first stage. The first workshops and small plants began to move into the industrial area at the beginning of 1977. However, until the official recognition of the settlement by the Likud Government, the status of Ma'aleh Adumim B remained that of a 'work camp' - this itself being a compromise between those favouring a fully recognized residential area and those now completely opposed to any residential framework owing to the associations with the Gush Emunim settlers. By the time the right-wing Likud came to power in May 1977, the outgoing Labour government recommended, at their last Cabinet meeting, the establishment of an urban residential satellite for Jerusalem containing 5,000 dwelling units, at a fresh site in this area. Owing to the subsequent planning of the more permanent settlements (i.e; the urban quarter of Ma'aleh Adumim and the Yishuv Kehillati of Kefar Adumim), the existing settlement of Ma'aleh Adumim B underwent no further official expansion. Eventually, in October 1979, the settlers at Ma'aleh Adumim B moved to their new, permanent site, located on the opposite side of the Jerusalem-Jericho highway. This has become the Yishuv Kehillati known as Kefar Adumim.

Common strands can be detected from the evolution of the

settlements of Kedumim and Kefar Adumim. The most obvious is the fact that it was the squatting tactics of the respective groups that forced the governments' hand in both cases. The settlement policy of the Labour government from 1967-1977 was based on the Allon Plan framework, with the consequent rejection of any plans proposing different policies. Nevertheless, the hard-line opinion within the Labour government, sympathetic to the Gush Emunim settlement policies and led by Defence Minister Shimon Peres, constituted a major factor in allowing the settlers to remain at Kedumim. Furthermore, these government sympathizers helped in finding employment for many of the settlers in the army camps or in the installation of their own infrastructure.

#### Recognition of Gush Emunim

As has been noted previously, the election of the right-wing government in 1977 brought about significant changes in the relationship between Gush Emunim and the ruling administration. The hard-line settlement policies of the Likud Government, and particularly of the major constituent party - the Herut party of Prime Minister Begin - were similar to those of Gush Emunim. The first public speech by the new Prime Minister was at the unofficial settlement of Camp Kaddum (now Kedumim), where he promised that there would be many more such settlements.

The first practical step in this direction was the legalization of the three existing Gush settlements in July 1977. These settlements would now receive government aid and grants to the same extent as any other new settlement in Israel. The new Agriculture Minister, Ariel Sharon, was subsequently appointed as chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee, that Committee set up by Yigal Allon in 1970 and subsequently chaired by him and his close ally Israel Galili. Sharon was one of the hard-line fundamentalists who most closely identified with the objectives of Gush Emunim, and over the next four years he became their closest ally in the Knesset. A second major appointment took place at the World Zionist Congress elections later in the same year. For the first time in the history of the Congress, there was a right-wing majority. Thus, a new candidate was

proposed to chair the influential Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, which had been so ably and pragmatically run by settlement expert, Professor Ra'anana Weitz, for the previous thirty years. However, the appreciation of Weitz's expertise was too great to eject him completely, and the new candidate - Matityahu Drobless - was appointed as co-Chairman. In reality, as the subsequent four years bear out, Weitz continued to devote his energies to settlement activity throughout Israel, but not in the highland areas of the West Bank. In this latter area, in which Weitz was opposed to settlement, Drobless took charge. In other words, Drobless directed the implementation of the settlement strategies of Gush Emunim and other likeminded activists. Since this area now received most of the settlement resources - largely through the influence of Sharon - Gush Emunim were able to press ahead with their settlement plans.

The recognition of Gush Emunim as a legal new settlement authority put them on a par with the established kibbutz and moshav movements. Thus they could now be represented on all the national settlement committees and would receive grants and loans in the same proportions as other settlement movements. However, such recognition meant that they had to take more care in the professional planning of their settlements. Their political statements were not sufficient to establish economically viable rural settlements. Furthermore, the majority of the Gush settlers were not inspired by socialist utopian ideals concerning the nature of the settlement within which they lived. This was a major factor in the development of a new settlement-type known as the Yishuv Kehillati (lit: Community Settlement) (13), in which there was a greater emphasis on the individual's right to choose his place of work and to exercise private control over his family life-style. Such settlements include commuting to the major Israeli towns as well as the establishment of private industry. Although the Settlement Department had continually refused to recognise this type of settlement as valid, owing to its negation of the traditional settlement principles of communal/collective living styles and home-based production, the changed political environment caused a reversal in this attitude. Furthermore, the emphasis on private and individual enterprise meant that these



settlements could be established quickly as compared to carefully planned kibbutzim and moshavim, thus enabling the widespread settlement of the West Bank as speedily as possible. Thus, the recognition of Gush Emunim as a new settlement movement gave rise to the recognition of the Yishuv Kehillati as a new settlement type.

### Notes to Chapter 3

1. O'Dea, J., 1976, 40.
2. Gush Emunim, n.d., 4.
3. Etzioni-Halevy, 1977.
4. Gush Emunim, 1976.
5. Ibid, 2.
6. Quoted in Lesch, A.M., 1977, 26.
7. Gush Emunim, 1977.
8. Gush Emunim, 1978.
9. For a description of the Sharon Plan, see:
  - a) Israeli press, 4/9/77.
  - b) Shapira, A., 25/8/78, Al Hamishmar Peace Supplement.
10. Drobless, M., 1978.
11. A description of the politics surrounding the establishment of Keshet is to be found in an appendix to Harris, W.W., 1978.
12. All three of these locations later became settlements. Mes'ha is now the urban quarter of Elkanah, located on the 'Sharon Highway' running from west to east through the West Bank, while Tekoa and Cochav Hashachar are both Community

Villages associated with Gush Emunim.

13. The first comprehensive analysis of the development of the Yishuv Kehillati is made by Newman, 1981, Chaps 5 & 6.



#### 4. THE EXISTING SETTLEMENT NETWORK

An analysis of the existing Jewish settlement pattern in the West Bank produces a picture of widespread activity overall, with localised concentrations of settlement. Jewish settlements in the West Bank in 1980 can be divided into five main groups (Fig. 10):

- (i) The settlements along the Jordan Rift Valley and the inner security road of the Allon Plan;
- (ii) The urban housing estates which have been built to surround Jerusalem;
- (iii) The block of settlements in Gush Etzion, to the south of Jerusalem;
- (iv) The small ruralised settlements of Gush Emunim, constituting an expanding network;
- (v) Settlements designated as urban.


This paper is specifically concerned with the third and fourth groups (1).

##### The Gush Emunim Settlements

In July 1980, there were 18 settlements affiliated to Amanah, the settlement movement of Gush Emunim (Fig 11), as well as a number of organised settler groups waiting to settle in new locations. Following the calling of elections in January 1981 for the coming summer, the government went ahead with a policy of establishing as many new settlements as possible in their last six months of office. This substantially increased the amount of land occupied by these settlements as well as the investment put into them. However, the immediate effect on increased numbers of Jewish settlers was negligible.

The existing settlements are located throughout the highland


FIGURE 10. JEWISH SETTLEMENT GROUPS IN THE WEST BANK, 1981



Source: Flitwick, 1979A, 1980/81



FIGURE 11. GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENTS, 1980




areas of the West Bank, particularly in locations near or overlooking the main north-south route from Jerusalem in the south, via Ramallah and Nablus, to Jenin in the north. Jewish settlement also stretches farther south along this route, by way of the Gush Etzion block of settlements and the urban quarter of Kiryat Arba. Those Gush settlements not located along this major route are situated along the intersecting east-west routes, mostly from the 'green line' in the west, while some continue down to the Jordan Valley in the east. The major east-west route is that of the recently constructed 'Sharon transect highway'. Although the two major lines of settlement to the east of the main north-south route were established as part of the Allon plan, it is apparent that the inner line of this settlement, along the Allon road itself, is becoming linked with the main Gush settlements. The distance between the two roads is small and, furthermore, one settlement on the Allon Road has recently been settled by a Gush Emunim sponsored group. Similarly, all the existing Jewish settlements in the area constituting the western part of the Allon Plan, namely a strip running along much of the old 'green line' border, were established by Gush Emunim (Beit Choron, Givon), or with their help (Elkanah - formerly Mes'ha). Finally, in August 1980, the government decided to go ahead with a final ten new settlements in the West Bank in the following year. Of these, one was designated for the Jordan Valley, one for the inner Allon Road, while another four were all designated for the main Gush Emunim areas in the highlands, taking into consideration the existing Gush settler groups.

The settlements are mostly of the private enterprise, Yishuv Kehillati type. The size of the existing Gush settlements varies from 130 families at Kedumim to only 14 families at Tappuah. It must be noted that, since the majority of Gush settlements are composed of inhabitants from the religious sector of the population, the average birth rate is higher than amongst the secular population. Thus, the average settlement in this area is planned to cater for families of six to eight people each.

## Urban Settlement

There are at present eight locations where settlement is designated as urban (Fig.12). The oldest of these is the urban quarter of Kiryat Arba, situated above the Arab town of Hebron. This was first settled in 1968, before the emergence of Gush Emunim, by many of the people who were later to be founder members of the Gush. It is the largest Jewish settlement in the West Bank today, and constitutes the southern end of the inner belt of settlements as proposed by Allon. The other major developments are the settlements at Beit El B, Givon, Ariel, Efrat, Ma'aleh Adumim, and Elkanah. These were all initiated with the help of the Gush, although they are not part of the settlements affiliated to Amanah, the settlement movement of Gush Emunim. Beit El B is designated as a small urban quarter situated next to the Gush settlement of Beit El. At present, its existence is based entirely on the religious seminary there and contains only a few families. The settlement of Givon, to the west of Jerusalem, contains 120 families. Although Gush Emunim settlers were responsible for the development of this settlement, the site had been noted as strategically important in all the plans for settlement of the 'Wider Jerusalem' area in 1976 (2). Elkanah is the outgrowth of the settlement of Mes'ha, which was approved by the outgoing Labour government in 1977, and subsequently legalized by the new Likud administration. The original settlers, the Ma'arav Shomron group, had been formed in response to the Housing Ministry plans for settlement of the 'Wider Jerusalem' area. The settlement of Ariel is planned to be the central city in 'Jewish Samaria' and is located at the centre of the north-south and west-east routes which dissect the northern part of the West Bank. In July 1980 it numbered 210 families, after only one year in existence. Efrat is to be an urban centre located in the Gush Etzion region. As of March 1981, the first housing units and infrastructure were undergoing construction. However, registration for houses in the first two stages was already closed due to the attractive nature of its location within the Etzion region and its close proximity to Jerusalem. The urban quarter of Ma'aleh Adumim, under construction to the east of Jerusalem on the main highway to the

FIGURE 12. JEWISH SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK DESIGNATED AS URBAN. 1981



Source: D. Newman, 1981




Jordan Valley, is seen as constituting an additional suburban housing estate to those mentioned above. However, its location some seventeen kilometres from the city and its later development than the other housing estates means that it will undergo a process of more individualistic development than the other suburbs.

### Regional Framework

These groups of settlements are slowly merging into a wider regional network covering the whole of the West Bank and this has been emphasized by the establishment in 1979/80 of three new regional councils - Shomron, Binyamin and Midbar Yehudah - to add to the already existing regional councils of Gush Etzion and the Jordan Valley (Fig.13). These councils coordinate activity between settlements in the region, particularly in the spheres of politics, economics and cultural facilities. They receive budgets from the Ministry of Interior at normal municipal rates and are also the recipients of local taxes in the settlements themselves. The establishment of such regional councils brings the regional administration of the Jewish settlements in these areas in line with the framework which operates throughout Israel.

Planning implementation following 1977 had to take into account settlements already in existence and which were now legalized. Thus the two existing major concentrations of Gush Emunim settlements have developed around the two oldest Gush settlements of Ophrah and Kedumim. A memorandum on Ophrah, dated 1977, discussed two alternatives for the integration of the existing settlement with other Jewish settlements in the region. One proposal was for regional co-operation with Gush Cochav Hashachar, the block of settlements being constructed on the Allon road and as part of the Jewish Agency Settlement Department plan for the development of the "Wider Jerusalem" area. The alternative proposal was for regional co-operation with new settlements of a communal character similar to Ophrah. Since that time, other Gush Emunim settlements have been established in the surrounding area, at Shiloh and Beit El, thus putting the

FIGURE 13. JEWISH REGIONAL COUNCILS IN THE WEST BANK, 1981



Source: Fieldwork 1980/81

second alternative into effect. This falls in line with the ideas propagated in the 1978 plans of Drobless and Gush Emunim. Drobless defines his Beit El bloc of settlement as including those of Beit El, Ophrah, Cochav Hashachar and Rimonim, the latter two having their roots in the Allon Plan. All these proposed settlements exist today and all are part of the new Jewish regional council of Binyamin, whose offices are located in Beit El. Such a regional grouping puts both options into effect at the same time. Regional co-operation with the Cochav Hashachar group of settlements has, in any case, taken place, because the settlement at Cochav Hashachar did not attract settlers to its bleak and hard location, owing to the fact that the line of settlement along the Allon road had neither the advantage of the Gush settlements near the main Jewish centres of the coastal plain, nor the possibility of using large tracts of land for agriculture as in the Jordan Valley settlements. Thus the army Nahal unit had to remain in Cochav Hashachar longer than originally planned (for a total of five years). This only changed when a group sponsored by Gush Emunim and interested in a more individualistic type of settlement structure offered to settle there. The first twelve families of settlers finally moved in during August 1980 and they maintain a close contact with Ophrah, which helps with the supply of provisions and with technical aid. Following the civilian settlement of this location, the Allon Road was paved, from Ma'aleh Efrayim in the north down to these two settlements, and was finally formally opened on 23rd February 1981. The road covers a distance of 48km from Ma'aleh Adumim in the south to Ma'aleh Efrayim in the north. It is also planned to extend the road further north to the settlement of Beka'ot, and from there down to the Jordan Valley and Beit Shean. In the south there exist long-term plans to extend the road to Arad.

The axis of inter-relationship between the Allon road and the Jordan Valley settlements as proposed in the Allon plan is, therefore, being reversed. The settlements of Cochav Hashachar and Rimonim, on the Allon Road, are establishing strong links with the Gush Emunim settlements to the west, and not only with the Jordan Valley settlements to the east. This regional

relationship thus partially negates the Allon concept of organized lines of 'security' settlement in only the sparsely populated areas of the West Bank. The relationships between the various settlements in the network are now taking on an important east-west linkage as distinct from simple north-south lines of settlement in the Jordan Valley and the overlooking hills. In August 1980, it was further announced that an extra settlement, Michmash, would be established four kilometres to the south of Rimonim and thus complete this regional block of settlements. Allon's plan of an Arab corridor from Ramallah to Jericho has been further negated by the decision to close the southern end of this corridor near Jericho, with the establishment of the Gush Emunim settlements of Mitzpeh Yericho and Vered Yericho. It was also announced, on 28th September 1980, that a third settlement, Beit Ha'arava, would also be established in this area.

Strong regional links are also developing in the area of Jewish settlement in Northern Samaria, and this area, from Tappuah up to the northern extremity of the West Bank, now comprises the Jewish regional council of Shomron. The initial Gush Emunim settlement at Camp Kaddum, now known as Kedumim, is located seven kilometres from the Jewish settlement of Karnei Shomron, which is planned as an urban centre to serve a number of surrounding Jewish villages, including Kedumim. Located seven kilometres to the north-east of Kedumim, on the main Nablus to Jenin road, is the Gush Emunim settlement of Shavei Shomron. The Samarian transect highway to be constructed to the south of Kedumim would lead directly to the proposed city of Ariel, some twelve kilometres away. Ariel is envisaged as being the central city for 'Jewish Samaria'.

In the Drobless proposals, Kedumim is to be only one of four settlements in the Kedumim bloc. This, theoretically at least, is to be bordered by another bloc of seven settlements centred on Karnei Shomron in the south-west. Finally, to the east would be Eilon Moreh. The establishment of the latter in June 1979, plus the fact that three of the ten new settlements to be announced in August 1980 are all in this North Samaria region, show a strong trend towards implementation of the Drobless proposals.

The various blocks of regional settlement also take into account the plans for settlement of the 'Wider Jerusalem' area. The Adumim block of settlement in the Drobless Plan consists of six rural villages, which would constitute a block of settlements additional to those of Gush Givon, Gush Cochav Hasbachar and Gush Etzion in the 'Wider Jerusalem' settlement plans, as originally proposed by the Jewish Agency Settlement Department in 1976. Each of these regional groups of settlement is well established today. The existing settlements in the Adumim region are those of the urban suburb of Ma'aleh Adumim, the Gush Emunim settlements of Kefar Adumim and Mitzpeh Yericho to the east, and the new settlement of Vered Yericho. In the Drobless plan, a further three settlements are proposed for the Adumim block, and these would be located to the north of Kefar Adumim, thus forming a territorial continuity with the Beit El block of settlements to the north, which, as has been noted, are adjacent to the Cochav Hashachar block and the Jordan Valley settlements to the east.

Plans also exist for the settling of the extreme south of the West Bank, between Hebron and Beer Sheba. Although there are some settlements in this region, it has not received the same degree of settlement activity by Gush Emunim as have the areas further north. The first settlement to be established here was the Gush Emunim settlement of Yattir, which is an agricultural-based moshav shitufi (3). Its initial temporary location was 500 metres inside the 'green line' border, but its permanent site is to be adjacent to the Iuzifer police station inside the West Bank. Another settlement is to be established in this region by the Zif group of Gush Emunim.

At the end of 1979, the Settlement Department had 94 settlements over the 'green line', of which 33 were still in their temporary stages and another five were still inhabited by the army nahal corps. Another 19 sites had received the necessary permission for establishment, thus giving a total of 113 small settlements. The total Jewish (non-urban) population of these settlements was 13,700 (2,400 more than in the previous year) (4). Including the urban settlements, there were 18,000 residents in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem), of whom



12,000 lived in the Judea/Samaria hill regions (including Gush Etzion and Kiryat Arba). The rest were in the Jordan Valley. This population was concentrated in twenty yishuv kehillati settlements, five moshavim, three kibbutzim, two industrial villages, one regional centre, and one industrial centre. Over 60 per cent of the settlers in Judea/Samaria are religious and the average age of the settler population is 32.

Despite all this activity, the network remains artificial in many respects. Economically, the settlements are dependent on high levels of government subsidisation, due to the political nature of the enterprise. Socially, there is hardly any contact between these new Jewish settlements and the existing Arab villages in the vicinity. It is particularly this latter factor which serves to emphasise the super-imposition of a radically different settlement network on that already existing.

Overall, then, new and distinctive settlement patterns had taken shape in the West Bank by 1980, even though no long-term government approved plan for this region existed. There are definite patterns, constituting a network of villages and small urban developments throughout the West Bank highland area, particularly in the Jerusalem region and in Northern Samaria. Although both the Gush Emunim and the Drobless proposals envisage hundreds of thousands of settlers, the reality of the situation is that the existing network contains some 18,000 inhabitants, equivalent to only 3 per cent of the Arab population of 720,000 (excluding East Jerusalem). The largest settlement is the urban quarter of Kiryat Arba with some 600 families. The total Jewish population of the West Bank is equal to only a third of the annual natural increase of the indigenous Arab population. Nevertheless, the settlements constitute a strategically strong network, controlling the major routeways and infrastructure of the West Bank. Apart from the Allon Road, major work is continuing (1981) on other routeways. These include a 30 km stretch of the Sharon trans-Samaritan 'Highway', extension of the Gush Etzion to Tekoa road through to Mitzpeh Shalem on the Dead Sea, and the completion of a trans-Judea road linking Beit Guvrin (east of Kiryat Gat in Israel) to Hebron. Most settlements are

now linked to the Israel national electricity grid, some of them receiving their supplies from the East Jerusalem Electric Corporation. Water is piped from across the 'green line' or is obtained from the new wells that have been sunk by Mekorot, the Israeli Water Company (5). Furthermore, the different settlement sub-areas are now organized into municipal regional councils covering the whole of the West Bank (Fig 12). These councils receive government funds and are responsible for coordinating all cultural and social activities within regions. Many of the Gush leaders now occupy the administrative jobs in these councils, particularly in the Shomron and Binyamin regions. It was also announced, in December 1980, that the Israeli military government was to establish municipal courts which would enable the application of Israeli law to the Jewish settlers in the West Bank. Until then, any civilian matters had to be adjudicated (in theory) by Arab courts using Jordanian law. Since military courts can only deal with security matters, the Jewish regional councils were unable to impose their own by-laws concerning such matters as taxation, sanitation and construction. The first court to be established would be in Kiryat Arba with an Appeal Court in Jerusalem (6).

The Gush and their supporters, therefore, were in a strong position, particularly with their close ally, Ariel Sharon, occupying the post of chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee. Just as Allon and Galili had used this post to push forward an acceptance of the Allon Plan as the main settlement doctrine before 1977, so, too, Sharon placed priority on his plan for widespread settlement and the similar Gush Emunim plan. Following the June 1981 elections, his appointment as Defence Minister made him the ultimate authority on all defence issues, within which settlement policy falls.

By February 1981, the Likud government had been responsible for the establishment of 165 settlements (including the Galilee outposts of a few families each) in the space of four years, as compared to 72 by the Labour government in the space of the previous ten years. Whereas in 1977 there had been 37 settlements in the West Bank, there were now 75 - excluding the

final ten promised by the Begin government in October 1980. Since 1977, over 6,700 sq m of industrial plant and commercial buildings had been erected in this region. Some 11,300 dunams of land are devoted to settlement out of the 150,000 dunams under Israeli military and civilian control.

Settlement activity gained momentum in the first five months of 1981. The government was now eager to push forward with its maximalist policies, in order to create as many settlements as possible by the elections. To speed matters, Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon announced a plan to allot areas of choice land in Jerusalem and other urban centres to building contractors who would undertake immediate construction activity in the West Bank and the Galilee. Between October 1980 and February 1981, some 24,000 dunams of land were seized in the West Bank. It was claimed that 20,000 of this was 'State' land while the other 4,000 was registered as belonging to Jews in the Gush Etzion area, although, if this is the case, it is hard to understand why this land was not used previously. The Knesset Finance Committee allocated IL5,500 million (\$79 million) for the establishment of six new settlements and the construction of 400 extra homes in existing locations, to be completed by election day. In February 1981, the settlement of Yakir was officially established. Work also began on the settlements of Nili, Mitzpeh Govrin and Shavei Shomron, and it was agreed to start work on Tekoa B in the near future. An extra 15,000 dunams of land in the Nablus area was earmarked for an industrial centre north of Ariel. According to figures released in April 1981 by the information centre in the Prime Minister's office, a total of 200,000 dunams had been allocated to Jewish settlement in the West Bank, 36,000 dunams since July 1980 (7). 30,000 dunams of this latter figure were classified as 'state land' but this was disputed by lawyers representing Arab petitioners against this land seizure. Following the re-election of the Likud Government in the elections of June 30th 1981, settlement policy continued along the lines of the previous four years. The many settlements established in the frantic build-up to the elections are undergoing a period of consolidation, while the infrastructural network is being expanded. A major issue, lying at the heart of

previous and future settlement activity, is that of the availability and ownership of the land tracts necessary for such developments. This is of crucial importance, and is examined in the following chapter.

#### Notes to Chapter 4

1. The other three groups of settlement are described in Harris, W.W., 1978 & 1980, and Newman, D., 1981.
2. The various plans for settlement of the 'Wider Jerusalem' area are compared in Jerusalem Municipality, 1977.
3. The moshav shitufi type of rural settlement combines the living style of the moshav with the communal working framework of the kibbutz.
4. Maoz, S., 28/2/80, Jerusalem Post, 'Settlements in territories get at least IS750 million for '80'.
5. For a description of Israel's water policies in the West Bank, see Davis, U., Maks, A.E.L., & Richardson, J., 1980; Khouri, R.G., 1980.
6. Brilliant, J., 17/12/80, Jerusalem Post, 'Municipal courts planned for settlers in West Bank'.
7. Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Information Division March 1981; Richardson, D. (12-18/4/81) Jerusalem Post International Edition, 'Dispute over how much land allocated to settlement'.

## 5. THE QUEST FOR LAND

Following a period of relative quiet on the settlement front during the summer of 1978, Gush activity was renewed in force towards the end of the year and was centred on the struggle to establish a settlement by the name of Eilon Moreh near Nablus. The Gush threatened to renew their policy of squatting unless the government continued to establish new settlements. The government was eager to avoid confrontation with the Gush, particularly as many members of the government were sympathetic to their cause. Most of the Gush demands were, in fact, acceded to and, in June 1979, the government approved the establishment of Eilon Moreh. The latter decision was to lead to a major conflict with the settlers when, in November 1979, they were ordered to move to a new site after the High Court had upheld an appeal by the local Arab landowners against the expropriation of their land. The land issue now played a major role in the Gush campaign. This related not only to the establishment of additional settlements but also to the expansion of existing ones. Many of the settlements had been established as extensions of army camps and, as they consolidated and grew, the settlers required more land for expansion. The land near the settlements was mostly private Arab land and the government was not prepared to expropriate it for Gush Emunim.

No private purchase by Jews was allowed. This was laid down by the Military Administration of the West Bank in an ordinance dated 15th September 1967, entitled 'Command concerning land transactions - The West Bank region'. Punishment for committing this offence was to be five years' imprisonment or a fine of 1500 dinars. For the government of Israel to change the status of any of this land, it would have to introduce civilian law to the West Bank. Since the West Bank is, under International Law, occupied territory, the government cannot do so. Thus their authority is exercised by means of the military government and acquisition of land is carried out by 'requisition' as distinct from outright 'confiscation'. This is an international concept and does not constitute a change in ownership rights. Theoretically, land taken for army purposes can only be used in cases of military



necessity. The owner should receive a payment for each year that it is used and should receive the land back as soon as the army no longer requires it. Agricultural areas do not fall into this category. In this way, most of the settlements were established on 'government' land for use by the military. However, the fact that civilian settlements were then established on this land gave the seizure an added dimension of permanence, in which such settlements represent a permanent 'strategic requirement'. Thus it is unlikely that the original owners would be able to claim that land back at a future stage.

By April 1973, the Israel Lands Administration had openly purchased over 30,000 dunams in the West Bank and about 18,000 dunams in Jerusalem. Gerson (1)<sup>\*</sup> notes that the actual area purchased was much larger, but that it had been registered in the name of Arab agents against 'irrevocable' bills of sale. Although Dayan continued to press the government to change the law so that private purchase would be allowed, this did not take place until 1979, under the Likud Government. But this did not extend to confiscation of private land in the West Bank since the government would have been required to change the whole legal status of the area to do so. However, Quiring (2) maintains that, in fact, the Israeli government has taken much private land even though the villagers had 'tapu' (land registry) documents dating from the Ottoman period which established their ownership in areas as yet untouched by the land registration process of the British administration. He asserts that the use of 'security' purposes as the rationale behind land acquisition eliminated the need for the government to file formal expropriation orders, thus avoiding any legal problems.

With the official government sanction for civilian settlements throughout Judea and Samaria under the Likud Government, Arab landowners began to file appeals against the use of their land for these purposes (3). The first 'order nisi' halting construction temporarily and giving the army a set time period in which they had to show cause why they should not cease construction was at Nveh Tsuf (Nebi Salah) in May 1978. The first major test case in the courts was that of Beit El, to the

north of Ramallah. In the same case, an appeal was also lodged against the use of land at Toubas in the Jordan Valley for the establishment of the Israeli settlement of Beka'ot. The case started in September 1978 and judgement was delivered in March 1979. The central question to which the Court had to address itself was the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also to the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. In the cases of both Beit El and Beka'ot, the petitioners were protesting against the seizure of their land and the denial of the right to enter their land as well as the establishment of Jewish civilian settlements on it (4). Whereas the land in the Beit El case had originally been requisitioned by the army in 1970, the case was only brought in 1978, after a civilian settlement had been authorised adjacent to the large Army camp. It was argued that such a settlement could not be established on land taken in such a way, since requisition meant that the land would be returned to the owners when no longer needed, while a civilian settlement implied permanency beyond the military time-span. The petitioners argued that the land was being used for civilian rather than military purposes and that, in any case, the seizure was not legal under International Law. In mid-September 1978, the High Court ordered the Defence Minister, the Commander of Judea and Samaria, and the Military Governor of the Ramallah area to show cause why they should not prevent construction for Israeli settlers at Beit El. A temporary injunction forbidding construction in the area during the legal proceedings was issued. This was the first time such an injunction had been issued against construction of a Jewish settlement beyond the 'green line'. The response of the army was that all Israeli settlements beyond the 'green line' constituted a part of the Israeli Defence Forces regional defence system and that they received priority in resource and manpower allocations. The settlements acted as a controlling factor and, in the case of Beit El, the settlement was located on a major road junction (the north to south Jerusalem-Nablus road; the east to west Jericho-Coastal Plain road), controlling the water, electricity and communications infrastructure of the region. In the opinion of the Military

Commander, the land seized was for urgent and necessary military needs.

The bench consisted of three High Court Judges. The final judgement (5), rejecting the appeal, held that

"there is no reason to doubt that the presence of settlements, even civilian ones, composed of citizens of the occupying power, in the occupied territory, is a significant contribution to the security of that territory . . . . . Jewish settlement in occupied territory - as long as the state of belligerency continues - serves genuine security needs".

Since the army acquired the land through requisition and not outright confiscation, the High Court decided that there was no contravention. One Judge drew the distinction between something being necessary in military terms and at the same time being acceptable under International Law. He ruled that the two concepts did not necessarily go together. Security did not have to be defined only in terms of army logistics. However, another Justice did concede that the land would have to be returned following any international agreements, owing to the temporary nature of its acquisition.

Following this case, others were brought in the High Court. The court rejected a similar application by 41 Arab landowners from Anata, a village to the north of Jerusalem, to stop the military government seizing 1700 dunams of land for a military camp (6). Preliminary work at Efrat, near Gush Etzion (7), at Matityahu, just across the 'green line' border (8) and at Ma'aleh Adumim B on the Jerusalem-Jericho road was halted by Court Order. However, these temporary injunctions were all eventually withdrawn once the Courts had decided, in each case, that they served as part of the overall regional defence system for the area. The one case where this did not happen was that of Eilon Moreh. An interim injunction was granted against further work at the site, and the government was ordered to show cause why it

should not cease construction of the settlement (9). Adequate defence reasons were not considered sufficient by the Court and, in November 1979, the Settlement was ordered to be dismantled within 30 days.

In addition to their anger at the Eilon Moreh judgement, Gush Emunim were opposed to the fundamental system which allowed these appeals to take place at all. They wanted the government formally to change the status of the land. In their Master Plan for Settlement (discussed below) they argued (10) that

"since Judea and Samaria is part of Eretz Israel, the birthplace of the Jewish people, it is necessary to establish ownership of land similar to the rest of Israel"

They called for the government immediately to lay claim to all unregistered land, to map this land and to forbid all use of it by unauthorised persons. Furthermore, they wanted to extend the law of outright confiscation for public purposes to areas beyond the 'green line'. They recommended a planned programme of land purchase in the Gaza Strip, the Galilee and the West Bank by means of government funds, the establishment of purchasing agencies and the extension of the right of purchase to the private sector. Finally, they demanded that plans be drawn up and that the government refuse to allow building by Arabs that did not comply with these plans. Any such building should be destroyed. The Gush decided to continue with a programme of action to signify their disapproval of the Arab court cases and to focus attention on their demands for new land laws. In August and October of 1979, the Gush settlers at Kedumim, Ophrah, Tekoa and the urban quarter of Kiryat Arba removed part of their boundaries and began to fence in extra areas of land in a demonstration against the prevailing trends. The Gush argued that only 30,000 dunams out of a total of five million dunams in the West Bank were in Jewish hands. Land bought by Jews before 1948 and which had been administered by the 'controller of enemy property' under the Jordanian government, had not been returned



since 1967. Only in the case of Karnei Shomron, with 7,000 dunams, did the Gush feel that expansion could take place. Although the settlers returned to their previous boundaries in each case, the point made was significant enough for the Likud faction to call on the government to solve the problems of land shortages for new and existing settlements. This resulted in the lifting of the government ban on private land acquisition by Jews anywhere beyond the 'green line'. However, the government was still not prepared to sanction the seizure of large tracts of Arab-owned land for widespread settlement as this would necessitate formal change of the legal status of these territories.

Of the eight settlements that wished to expand but were unable to do so, seven were allocated additional amounts of land totalling a further 4,000 dunams. This was still insufficient for the Gush Emunim development plans, and they organised a series of "sit-ins" at thirty locations in the West Bank on 13th October 1979. A review of the various options open to the government was prepared by the Attorney General, Yitzchak Zamir, in February 1980 (11). The basic options appeared to be as follows:

- a) Maintenance of the existing legal position, whereby state-owned or private lands seized for 'military' purposes were used for settlements;
- b) The application of Jordanian law providing for expropriation of land for 'public purposes';
- c) The application of the equivalent Israeli law providing for expropriation for the same reasons;
- d) Declaration of the territories as not being 'occupied' and thus not subject to international law;
- e) Official government annexation of the territories.

In May 1980, Ariel Sharon was appointed head of a new



ministerial committee, the objective of which was to find land for these and other settlements. Within a fortnight, the committee had 'discovered' sufficient state-owned land and 'unregistered' land for the expansion of the settlements of Elkana, Ariel, Kedumim, Efrat and Givon, while Beit Horon was allocated an alternative site nearby. The committee also undertook to find more land for Ophrah and Kiryat Arba. One of the means they used to find this land was to allocate areas of land in the lower regions of the hills to settlements located at the top of these hills. This would leave the Arab villages on the slopes as enclaves between the Gush settlement and its land. In the cases of the planned towns of Givon and Efrat, the Arab land would become reservations within the new boundaries. The owners would be permitted to continue cultivation of these lands but not to build on them. The Justice Ministry argued that there had been no change in the criteria used to find the extra land, meaning that no tracts cultivated in the previous ten years, or land registered as privately owned had been taken. Sharon, therefore, argued that this solution could only be temporary and that what was needed was a change in the legal status of land to allow full expropriation.

#### Notes to Chapter 5

1. Gerson, A., 1978, 141.
2. Quiring, P., 1978.
3. An individual claiming ownership of 'State Land' which has been allocated to a Jewish settlement is entitled to appeal within 21 days of the publication of the statutory notice declaring the area to be 'State Land'. Within this period, no work is allowed to be carried out on the land in question.
4. Transcripts of the Court Proceedings as follows:
  - (i) Petitioners' brief.
  - (ii) Supplement to petitioners' brief on the Applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention with Particular Reference to Article 49.

- (iii) Petitioners' affidavit Toubas Case (September 11th, 1978)
  - (iv) Petitioners' affidavit Beit El (el Bire) case (September 8th, 1978)
  - (v) Written summation of petitioners' arguments.
  - (vi) Respondents'(government) affidavit,Toubas Case (November 1978)
  - (vii) Respondents' (government) affidavit, Beit El Case (November 6th, 1978)
  - (viii) Respondents' (government) brief, submitted November 20th 1978.
  - (ix) Summary of High Court ruling.
5. Ibid, (ix), 4.
  6. 18/12/78, Jerusalem Post, 'Anata landowners lose case against seizure'.
  7. 25/7/79, Jerusalem Post, 'High Court halts work at Efrat'.
  8. 26/7/79, Jerusalem Post, 'High Court drops injunction against Matityahu'.
  9. 16/9/79, Jerusalem Post, 'Begin's role explained in Eilon Moreh decision'; 31/12/79, Jerusalem Post, 'Arabs may challenge Eilon Moreh delay'.
  10. Gush Emunim, 1978, Appendix I, 34-36, 'Guidelines on the Lands Issue'.
  11. 29/2/80, Jerusalem Post, 'State leaders study Zamir's opinion on territories' status'.

## 6. GUSH EMUNIM AND ISRAELI POLITICS: AN OVERVIEW

Hartshorne (1950) has developed the idea of the *raison d'être* of states (1). This concept holds that, at any time, the state is seen as existing in dynamic equilibrium between the centripetal forces which bind it together and work for its survival and the centrifugal forces which threaten to tear it apart. For the State to continue to exist, the centripetal forces must outweigh the centrifugal ones. The basic centripetal force is the elusive *raison d'être*. Similarly, Muir (1975) argues that each State has a stage in a dynamic equilibrium between forces of integration and disintegration and realignment. The relationships between people, territory and government embody these relationships and

"the closer the attitudes towards territorial and political organisation of the various elements in the population are to one another and to those of the government, the more internally stable the State is likely to be" (2).

The *raison d'être* of the State of Israel is a Jewish homeland where Jews can live free from persecution and where a society based on Jewish heritage and values can be developed. To religious Jews and others with a feeling for Jewish history, this *raison d'être* is extended to require that home to be only in the ancient Biblical Jewish land. Although it may be argued that Gush Emunim are fighting for what they see as constituting the *raison d'être* of the State, they are nevertheless part of the centrifugal forces in the sense that their actions cause much dissent and strife amongst the Jewish population.

Eckstein (1966) holds that political cohesion is, under certain conditions, compatible with any kind of division (3). Stable democracy requires a balancing of all major contradictory social and political viewpoints, and these are often brought together by a threat facing the nation as a whole. This often causes a feeling of solidarity, which serves as a strength or a stabilising force for the political regime. In Israel, this has

always been the case during the Wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. But each successive War has caused the internal differences of opinion to become magnified and this has been most apparent when armed conflict has come to a halt. Thus, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 led to a strengthening of the two extremes of opinion regarding the status of the territories and peace negotiations. This, in turn, led to the subsequent emergence of Gush Emunim.

Schnall (1977) notes that, before 1973, there had only ever been limited radical or militant dissent in Israel and, on the occasions when it did occur, it was only supported by a minority of the population (4). Sprinzak (1977) further notes that, between 1948 and 1967, there had been an 'operative consensus' within Israel, in which the political centre was able to develop its own rules and function according to them, without any peripheral interference. Any peripheral groups that did develop during this period were forced to operate from within the political centre, as witnessed by their decision to participate in Knesset elections on political platforms (5). Etzioni Halevy (1977) shows how both the Black Panthers and the Young Couples Protest movements attempted to work from within the system rather than clamouring for radical revolutionary change. No group employed violence and none succeeded in mobilizing mass support. Thus, protest had not been allowed to sidetrack the basic national development policies of Zionism. The strong collective commitment of the Israelis served as an integrative mechanism in emphasising unity of the Jewish nation (6). Sprinzak argues that 1967 was the watershed in this trend. Following the War of 1967, the operative consensus began to be shattered by peripheral activities which eventually led to their general acceptance post-1973. He asserts that only in this post-Yom Kippur War period did extreme politics become an important element in the political system. Protest movements of previous periods are described by him as being "simply outbursts of rage against specific wrongs" (7), including such instances as the demonstrations against German reparations in 1952, and Moroccan demonstrations against alleged discrimination in 1959.

Sprinzak goes on to distinguish between the concept of extreme politics and that of the politics of illegitimacy (8). The former operates as an extra-parliamentary activity, being more anti-establishment than anti-democratic. However, when this is connected with an ideological position which denies the legitimacy of the democratic regime, it becomes anti-democratic and is concerned with the politics of illegitimacy. Similarly, Etzioni Halevy, while arguing that the theory of democracy has stressed the importance of citizen participation, notes that there is a danger inherent in excessive involvement on the part of citizens which curtails a government's freedom of action (9).

It can be argued that the squatting activities of Gush Emunim have meant that they have crossed this boundary between acceptable anti-government protest and non-acceptable anti-democratic action, although their leadership reject this charge in justifying their actions by recourse to a higher order. In contrast to other groups, Gush Emunim have become entrenched in the political scene as an independent entity and have been effective in furthering their own aims. Whereas foreign affairs in Israel have always been controlled by a small elite (10), Gush Emunim have presented a challenge to this domination. An indication of the Gush as a political factor is that the government today has to consider the possible reactions from the Gush to any initiative concerning Arab-Israeli affairs. Their effect on Israeli society was clearly seen in the case of Eilon Moreh. Having received government sanction for the establishment of a settlement near Nablus in June 1979, the settlers were ordered to move to an alternative location following a successful appeal by the Arab landowners in the Israeli High Court. The Gush did not wish to move, since they interpreted such an action as providing a precedent for future action. Only after much public debate and acrimony did they eventually move, and only then after they had extracted from the government a promise to set up a Select Committee to examine the whole issue of settlement in the West Bank, with a view to the adoption of an approved government plan for settlement.

According to Trice (1978), one of the ways by which interest



groups can put forward their views is by becoming a part of the 'cultural milieu' which helps shape the perceptions and behaviour of governmental policy makers (11). Through the acceptance of a great part of the Gush ideology within sections of the Likud coalition, this has taken place to the point where they are a recognized and legal settlement movement. Since interest groups stand between formal government decision making and mass public opinion, they have to

"rely on those people within the government who do have such authority to translate their policy preferences into decisional outputs" (12)

In the case of Gush Emunim, the personality who became their champion was Ariel Sharon, the head of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee, while the joint head of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, Matityahu Drobless, helped put their plans into effect. Were it not for Sharon, they might have remained an unofficial movement, unable to receive the development budgets from the Ministries of Agriculture, Housing, Education, Defence and Religious Affairs.

Although the Gush started life as a political pressure group, they have now built up the necessary organizational framework capable of dealing with budgetary allocations at a wide level. The official settlement movement of Gush Emunim is known as Amanah, and this body deals specifically with the technical issues, such as the number of houses in each settlement, the means by which new members can be accepted as residents and the various budgetary allocations.

Overall, Gush Emunim have had a powerful effect on Israeli society. Isaac (13) asserts that the process by which the territories have been pushed to the forefront of Israeli political life has meant that consensus politics have been replaced by ideological politics. This is dangerous for Israeli society, in that such ideological issues, with the fervour they attract, can spill over to other issues such as religious and

economic ones.

This is particularly so with respect to resource allocation to settlements in other regions such as the Galilee, the Jordan Valley and the Golan Heights. Weitz (1978 & 1979) argues that, not only is it politically wrong to settle the densely populated areas of the West Bank, but that the almost total redirection of resources from other regions to the West Bank Highlands has left the settlement networks in these other regions in danger of collapsing. Too many new settlements are being established in too short a time, while settlements already in existence are being deprived of the necessary resources to continue.

#### Notes to Chapter 6

1. Hartshorne, R., 1950, 95-130.
2. Muir, R., 1975, 113.
3. Eckstein, H.H., 1966.
4. Schnall, D.J., 1977, 148-160.
5. Sprinzak, E., 1977, 33-47.
6. Etzioni-Halevy, B., 1977.
7. Sprinzak, E., 1977, 35.
8. Ibid.
9. Etzioni-Halevy, B., 1977.
10. Brownstein, L., 1977, 259-279. The general processes of Israeli foreign policy and its decision making processes are analysed in detail in Brecher, M., 1972 & 1974.
11. Trice, R.H., 1978, 238-252.

12. Ibid.

13. Isaac, R.J., 1976.

## 7. CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the development of the Gush Emunim settlement framework. It has been seen that their impact has been substantial - out of all proportion to their actual size. The similarity between the policies of the Gush and the sentiments of the right-wing government since 1977 has made it possible to implement the settlement strategies within the official framework. A strong sense of nationalism, fuelled by historical associations and religious fervour, has provided the ideological justifications for this activity, over and above the argument stressing the need for security. Nevertheless, Hinsley has noted that

"it is just when the national political loyalty is most extreme that it is ceasing to be national" (1).

Thus, many Israeli groups oppose Gush Emunim on the grounds that the Gush are an obstacle to peace and that dialogue with the Arabs cannot be carried out while new settlements are being established. Furthermore, the fact that the Gush have resorted to non-democratic behaviour in pursuing their objectives is not viewed favourably within Israel.

The implementation of the Gush settlement policies through the medium of the Yishuv Kehillati has shown that the switch to the right has not been just a foreign affairs issue. Etzioni-Halevy (2) notes that the appeal of egalitarianism has decreased steadily over the past two decades and that a new competing ideology has come to the forefront, being one of equity rather than of equality. Thus, increasingly less of the population are prepared to accept constraints of life-style brought about by the rigid adherence to traditional settlement planning principles. This is important in understanding the new private enterprise type of settlement.

Nevertheless, as long as the Arab-Israel conflict continues to maintain its role in the centre of world affairs, it is the

settlement location policies which will be of more interest to the observer than the settlement type. The validity of new settlement types in a realistic economic environment can only come about if and when the artificial subsidies, based on political and strategic factors, are removed. This, in turn, will only happen when there is some sort of meaningful conflict resolution. Conflict resolution of an acceptable nature to all sides depends upon the participation of both moderate and hard-line elements, representing all views. It can be argued that the beginnings of conflict resolution often start from the adoption of an extremist position, since the alternative option is one of renewed physical conflict on an even larger scale. Within Israel, the coming to power of the hard line Likud government in 1977 helped create the conditions by which President Sadat made his historic visit to Jerusalem. However, the stage following such a breakthrough may necessitate the transfer of power to that group adopting a more moderate line. The slow pace of development of the Camp David accords, outside the immediate peace agreement with Egypt, is a pointer in this direction. The Labour party argues that its more moderate position on the issue of the West Bank, due to the absence of the powerful emotional historical/religious factors, makes it a more suitable administration in attempting to renew the peace process. This author argues that their policy of 'moderation' is only relative to the domestic front, but with respect to the other parties in the conflict is simply slightly less extreme than the Likud position (3). Although the Labour party may justify the Allon Plan type of proposals as being valid due to the need to develop 'secure' and 'defensible' borders, the emphasis on settlement anywhere in the territories is unacceptable to the Arabs. Any acceptable solution agreed upon by all moderate and extreme interests would have to take the whole West Bank into consideration, and be dependent upon the wishes of the indigenous majority population. Policies of settlement establishment, in whichever area, are unlikely to bring about a change in negotiating positions that will greatly alter the stalemate reached in the peace process by 1981.



## Notes to Chapter 7

1. Hinsley, F.H., 1973.
2. Etzioni-Halevy, 1977.
3. The Labour political programme represents the hard line Labour element. This was seen in the previous October, when Israel Galili beat the moderate Chaim Herzog in the fight to be responsible for drawing up the programme. Their programme stated that the continuation of

"settlement in the Jordan Valley . . . . .  
in the Etzion Block, in the surroundings of  
Jerusalem, in the south of the Gaza Strip,  
and also on the Golan Heights - according to  
consideration of strategic activity and in  
close coordination with the Israel defence  
Forces - is vital to the security of the  
State".

(See: Middle East International, 30/1/81. No. 142, 5.).  
This policy would have witnessed a return to that of the  
Allon strategy, described in Chapter 2.

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#### Topic Papers

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